Il desiderio di un'etica nell'epoca dell'immagine del mondo dominata dalla tecnica

Abstract

The question about the essence of modern technique is posed from the point of view of a desire to go beyond anthropological-instrumental conceptions of technique: in fact, it recognizes the profound connection between the metaphysics of subjectivity and the advent of the world of technology, the last of the temptations or risks must be to fall back into instrumental anthropological conceptions of the technique. In fact, we must not make the mistake of considering that at the origin of the technique is the scientific calculation of nature, the sum expression of the self-affirmation of the subject in the sense that the technique is entirely dominable by man: this is precisely the illusion generated by metaphysics of subjectivity. On the contrary, the oblivion of being, its necessary absence, advances through the metaphysics of the subject. In this context, Heidegger, starting from the perspective of decentralization of the human and from the suggestion that man is not the owner of other entities but is called instead to the responsibility of custody of other entities, comes to argue that in the era of technoscience ethics can only be rethought in the dimension of planetary macro-action and not to the extent of the single individual. The question about the essence of modern technique is posed from the point of view of a desire to go beyond anthropological-instrumental conceptions of technique: in fact, it recognizes the profound connection between the metaphysics of subjectivity and the advent of the world of technology, the last of the temptations or risks must be to fall back into instrumental anthropological conceptions of the technique. In fact, we must not make the mistake of considering that at the origin of the technique is the scientific calculation of nature, the sum expression of the self-affirmation of the subject in the sense that the technique is entirely dominable by man: this is precisely the illusion generated by metaphysics of subjectivity. On the contrary, the oblivion of being, its necessary absence, advances through the metaphysics of the subject. In this context, Heidegger, starting from the perspective of decentralization of the human and from the suggestion that man is not the owner of other entities but is called instead to the responsibility of custody of other entities, comes to argue that in the era of technoscience ethics can only be rethought in the dimension of planetary macro-action and not to the extent of the single individual.