What Does Nemesis Have to Do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle’s Neglected Emotion and Its Relevance for Law and Politics

Abstract

Abstract Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan ¼ from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune. That another’s good fortune is a central element of nemesis can also be inferred by the contraposition Aristotle proposed between nemesis and pity, which is pain at undeserved bad fortune. The modern concept of indignation, commonly used as a translation for the word nemesis, refers to outrage at a general form of injustice, and usually a serious one. The authors intend to remain faithful to the original meaning of the term and to explore the impact it can have with respect to law. In contrast to the existing literature, which especially during the 1960s, discredited the narrow conception of indignation as defined in Aristotelian terms and interpreted indignation in terms of negative emotions such as envy or resentment, they argue that this emotion has a central position in legal reasoning and legal thought. Nemesis is that emotion which creates a strong conceptual bond between rectificatory justice (to diorthotikon dikaion), which today we may define as typical of legal reasoning, and distributive justice (to dianemetikon dikaion), typical of the moral and political realm. The concept of individual desert is presented as the juncture between the moral, the legal and the political fields.