Coalition building in the UN Security Council

Abstract

Political coalitions in the international system are still understudied in International Relations theory. This article claims that the formation of and variations in coalitions in the international system are affected by changes in their bargaining power and bargaining environment related to the global leadership cycle and by long-term organisational changes of the international political system. Identifying the Security Council as the institution in which states are more likely to keep their systemic preferences at the institutional level, the article studies the presence, formation and change of coalitions in the international system by testing variations in the behaviour of the Security Council members in the period 1993-2012. To overcome methodological difficulties, it proposes to analyse sponsoring rather than voting behaviour. In the analysed period, the presence of a mutating dominant coalition, signs of potential coalitions in the making and an increase in participation and competition resulting from modifications in the organisational form of the international system are found.