SUBJETIVISMO ÉTICO Y OBJECIÓN DE CONCIENCIA

Abstract

In this paper, I will present the conceptual differences between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, which have been depicted by liberal authors such as J. Rawls, J. Raz and in Spain by M. Gascón Abellán. I will argue that conscientious objection, as a practice that is distinct from civil disobedience and rests on a right to “moral privacy”, finds his justification on a subjectivist ethics or on a voluntarist account of natural law. I will try to show that in both cases, it is not clear how a) to justify legal norms that tries to balance the objectors’ claims and the opposite claims of rights’ holders b) to determine the seriousness of the ethical commitment of conscientious objectors, in order to avoid the risk of encouraging self-interested forms of objections. Finally, I will apply the arguments to the case of conscientious objection to the subject Educación para la Ciudadanía.