Budgetary practices in the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Munitions in Italy, 1915–1918

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine state budgeting for the costs of the First World War (WWI) in Italy. Troops, weapons and munitions were initially managed by the Ministry ofWar (1915–1917) and then jointly with the Ministry of Munitions (1917–1918). The change was intended to improve efficiency, cut costs and prevent fraud and corruption. However, the budgetary system proved incapable of achieving these aims. The ministry budgets were adjusted in wartime to disclose the additional costs of pursuing the conflict in a generalised way. Before the war, the budget report contained 101 items. When the war broke out only one additional category was added ‘War Expenses’ even though this comprised 90% of total costs by the end of the conflict. Drawing on a range of primary sources the paper analyses likely reasons for limited disclosures about the cost of the war, and emphasises the role of economic and political elites and systems of procurement. The experience of Italy in WWI confirms that budgeting is a socio-political, as well as a technical process.