La forma di governo regionale siciliana tra modello teorico e resa applicativa

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the form of government of the Sicilian Region in light of the reform introduced by Constitutional Law No. 2 of 2001, which established the direct election of the President of the Region and introduced a model commonly described as a “neo-parliamentary” system. Starting from a comparison between the original assembly-based framework provided by the 1946 Statute and the subsequent institutional configuration, the study explores the gap between the theoretical model designed by the constitutional legislator and its practical implementation. By analysing institutional practice and the dynamics of regional governments since 2001, the paper shows that the objective of executive stability has been largely achieved through the simul stabunt simul cadent mechanism, resulting in a form of stability that is often “coercive” rather than politically grounded, and not always accompanied by an effective strengthening of political accountability and decision-making capacity. The analysis highlights the systemic tensions produced by the interaction between the growing presidentialisation of the executive, party fragmentation, and the limited effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. The paper ultimately reflects on possible institutional adjustments aimed at rebalancing stability and political accountability, suggesting reforms capable of strengthening the role of the Regional Assembly and the democratic accountability of the executive without undermining the simul stabunt simul cadent principle.