Doctoral Program in Economics and Management
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Agency Theory, February 2010
Prof.
Salvatore Modica
Syllabus:
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Preface: Expected Utility Theorem, Risk Aversion
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Adverse Selection in Competitive
Environments: Akerlof-type Market Failure
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Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard (Hidden Action)
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Principal-Agent Model:
Adverse Selection (Hidden Information)
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Introduction to Mechanism Design:
Formalization, Revelation Principle; Auctions and the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem; Bargaining and the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem.
Reference Textbook
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MasColell, Whinston, Green: Chs. 13
(sections A, B), 14, 23 (sections A-E)
Other References
- Laffont-Martimort, Theory of Incentives
- Salanie, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer
- Bolton-Dewatripoint, Contract Theory