Undercover Disruption: Stealth Jamming Attacks on 5G Synchronization Stages

Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive study on selective jamming, focusing on its impact on the synchronization phases of the 5G New Radio (NR). We introduce STORM, a novel framework tool designed to assess jamming attacks on the cell search phases of 5G User Equipment (UE). The research incorporates both simulation and experimental evaluations, providing a detailed account of the methodology employed. A unique aspect of the proposed approach is the implementation of a jamming technique that remains undetectable to external entities due to its synchronization with the gNB’s Synchronization Signal Block (SSB). Furthermore, the implemented jamming operates at a duty cycle of 3.55% of continuous jamming, leading to significant optimization in terms of energy consumption and computational resources. STORM underscores that the success rate of jamming attacks and the necessary Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR) for effective disruption are significantly influenced by the specific configurations of the jamming signal. The paper discovers that the Primary Synchronization Signal (PSS) exhibits a higher degree of resilience compared to the Secondary Synchronization Signal (SSS), requiring a greater jammer transmission power to interfere with the cell search procedure.