Mafia Methods, Extortion Dynamics and Social Responses

Abstract

The chapter is devoted to the empirical results and the policy proposals produced by the EU Gloders project. It describes a database of 535 extortion cases, which is a large but not necessarily representative sample of the extortion situation in Sicily. Some entrepreneurs (including most of those registered on our database) comply with the mafia's pretenses, because they fear costly retaliation. We can refer to them as "acquiescent victims". Differently, others do not act out of fear, but rather because, on the basis of their culture, beliefs and models of behaviour, they believe that paying protection money is "natural" and "normai" in their social community. We can classify this second category as "tame acquiescent". Both behaviours are morally and civically questionable, but do not constitute a criminal offence or attract a criminal punishment. However, the last category comprises entrepreneurs that, apart from paying what the mobsters request, mak:e use and exploit their relation ships with them in order to distort market relationships, scare competitors and obtain unfair benefits. We will return to this category-which can be defined as that of the complicit of entrepreneurs-in the final section. Anti-racket legislation is an indirect instrument (La Spina, 2008a, 2008b) which-along with the direct repression of mafia affiliates-carried out in Italy through a vast array of tools-is aimed at fighting members of criminal organisa tions by isolating them and draining away their incomes.