Intelligenza artificiale e lesione della proprietà intellettuale

Abstract

The thesis according to which those created by AI cannot be considered intellectual works protectable by law as they lack the requirement of creativity reflects an idea of law incapable of grasping the extent of the challenge represented by this last frontier of technological development. Denying AI outputs the dignity of intellectual works on the assumption that creativity is an attribute of human intelligence alone means not solving the problem but simply denying it. Having said this, it should then be added that due to the way in which AI works, through training which involves the administration of a very high number of reproductions of intellectual works (input), destined to culminate in the elaboration of an output which does not is, in most cases, neither a copy nor a re-elaboration of the inputs, the space for an application of traditional copyright protection is very limited. It is more realistic to imagine that the authors' reasons can find protection through recourse to the regulation of contracts based on an enhancement of the role of the bodies and collective management bodies of the rights recognized to them.