Reasons, Rules, Exceptions. Towards a Psychological Account

Abstract

In this paper we defend a psychological account of rule-based reasoning, specifically of the relationship between rules and exceptions. The topic of our inquiry are the relations between rules, the reasons underlying them, and exceptions. In analysing these relations, first, we outline an apparent paradox, the “paradox of rules”, and a related problem, the “problem of reconsideration”. Then, we propose a solution to, or better dissolution of, the paradox, grounded in an account of the psychological processes underlying rule-application and reconsideration. We claim, that is, that the problem of reconsideration should be answered by appealing to matters of sheer psychological fact. The upshot of this argument is a psychologistic conception of rules and of rule-based reasoning. We will explain what we mean by “psychologism” and why, to our minds, a psychologistic theory of rules and of rule-based reasoning is on the right track.