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ABSTRACTS

Keith Allan

Monash University

Getting a grip on context

The significance of context to the proper interpretation of texts has been known for millennia; it is implicit in some of Aristotle's recommendations in *Rhetoric* and Quintilian's in*Institutes* that rhetoric should ideally be appropriate to what was, post Augustine, called its context. Malinowski wrote that a stick may be used for different purposes in different contexts, e.g. digging, punting, walking, fighting. Exactly the same is true of language expressions, e.g. a word which is an insult in one context may be an expression of camaraderie or endearment in another (and vice versa). Well recognised this may be, and the defining characteristic of a context for a particular occasion of utterance can often be described, but – though broad outlines exist – the metric for recognising a context for all and any given utterance has not been clearly identified. The aim of this essay is to deconstruct the notion of context into its component parts and elucidate the way in which the various components of context serve to determine different aspects of meaning of the same language expression.

Jay Atlas

Pomona College, USA

Quine's famous argument in his seminal 1956 "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" has been discussed intensely and voluminously, but it has not yet been fully appreciated for what it tells us, and more importantly shows us, about the semantics-pragmatics interface. In returning to this classic essay, I shall provide a new intepretation of the famous Ortcutt argument and draw some new lessons for the analysis of 'believes' sentences.

Anne Bezuidenhout

University of South Carolina, USA

Joint reference

I begin by adopting two crucial assumptions. Firstly, I adopt the view that it is not words that refer but rather people who refer by using words in appropriate contexts. So referring is a kind of linguistic action. And linguistic actions in turn are just one specialized kind of purposive action. Secondly, I adopt the view that it is possible to perform a purposive action jointly. That is to say, two or more agents in coordination with each other can do their part to bring about a joint accomplishment that would not be brought about by any of the individuals acting alone. (A classic example is a crew of workers moving a heavy piano up a flight of stairs. No one individual in the crew in isolation can be said to be moving the piano). Putting these two assumptions together, I will argue that there are cases of joint referring, where two or more interlocutors do their part to produce an outcome (referring) that would not have resulted from the efforts of any of the individuals acting alone.

Sarah E. Blackwell

The University of Georgia

How Discourse Connectives Mean More

This paper presents arguments and evidence in support of adopting a neo-Gricean approach to the interpretation of discourse connectives in English and Spanish. In Grice's (1975, 1989) view, discourse connectives like *but*, *so*, and *therefore* conveyed conventional implicatures; that is, instead of being part of what is "said", i.e. part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance containing them, these expressions encoded an implicit proposition that did not need to be inferred. For instance, Grice argued that in *He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave*, the connective *therefore* conventionally implicates that "his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman" (1975:44). By contrast, according to Blakemore (1987), who adopts a Relevance Theory perspective, discourse connectives are "expressions that constrain the interpretation of the utterances that contain them by virtue of the inferential connections they express" (1987:105). Similarly, Fraser (1999), who uses the term *discourse marker* to refer to many of the same connective expressions, defines them as "a class of lexical expressions that…signal a relationship between the segment they introduce, S2, and the prior segment, S1. They have a core meaning, which is procedural, not conceptual, and their more specific interpretation is 'negotiated' by the context, both linguistic and conceptual" (1999:931).

Regardless of the term used to refer to them, most definitions of these connective expressions describe them as non-truth-conditional, i.e. they "contribute nothing to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by an utterance," a claim that usually does not entail that such expressions are without semantic meaning (Schourup 1999:242). And, Blakemore (2002)

notes, two theoretical assumptions made by linguists who have analyzed discourse connectives are (i) that they encode linguistic meaning while being non-truth-conditional, and (ii) they mark connections in discourse (2002:2). However, in this paper, I argue that while much of the research on discourse connectives has focused on their status as non-truth-conditional expressions that encode procedural meaning (see, e.g., Hall 2007), far less emphasis has been placed on how they <u>enrich</u> the interpretation of an utterance and how this interpretation is <u>negotiated by (and thus constrained by) the context</u>. To address this issue, I propose that the interpretation of both English and Spanish connectives be explained in terms of Levinson's (2000) neo-Gricean principle of I(nformativeness). Huang (2014:57) summarizes Levinson's I-principle as follows:

<u>Speaker's maxim of minimization</u>: 'Say as little as necessary'…produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends…

<u>Recipient's corollary: the rule of enrichment</u>. Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation…Assume the richest temporal, causal and referential connections between described situations or events, consistent with what is taken for granted. Assume stereotypical relations obtain…

I shall argue that 'I-inferences' are triggered by the use of 'unmarked' English and Spanish connectives (e.g., *and/y, but/pero, sino, because/porque, so/así que*). In other words, these expressions may be viewed as generating I-implicatures. One classic type of I-implicatures that lends support for this approach is "conjunction buttressing" (Huang 2014:58):

p and q +> p and then q (temporal sequence)

    +>   p therefore q (causal connectedness)

    +>   p in order to cause q (teleology, intentionality)

John pressed the spring and the drawer opened.

+> John pressed the spring and then the drawer opened.

+> John pressed the spring and thereby caused the drawer to open.

+> John pressed the spring in order to make the drawer open.

The proposed approach emphasizes both the role of the discourse connective <u>and</u> the semantic, contextual, and frame-based stereotypical contributions of the discourse segments they connect. As such, it strives to offer a more explanatory account of connective <u>and</u> utterance meaning in both Spanish and English.

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Brian Butler

Asheville, University of Noth Caroline, USA

Law and the Priority of Pragmatics to Principle

Abstract: Ronald Dworkin in *Law's Empire* famously utilized what he described as the "semantic sting" to explain both why the concept of "law" is

both an essentially contestable concept and essentially interpretive. Not only that but any conception of law is on his terms based upon constructive interpretation. Ultimately his theory makes law and legal practice turn on an essentially semantic dispute over what the best conception of law is. That is, law is in all its worldly glory an interpretive concept. In this paper I will argue that law is better analyzed as a set of practices and that emphasis upon the interpretive or "semantic" aspects of law crowds out the more important behavioral and concrete aspects of legal practice. Therefore, the paper will aim to show the primacy of pragmatics in legal practice and an understanding of "law" writ large.

Alessandro Capone

University of Messina

Embedding Explicatures (some cases of implicit indirect reports).

On various occasions, I was brought to reflect on implicit indirect reports, and this time I will expatiate on embedding explicatures as one case of implicit indirect reports. To give you some cases of implicit indirect reports consider two cases brought to my attention by a philosopher of language and a conversation analyst respectively:

(1) John believes Mary went to the cinema
(2) John is happy.

Belief reports, according to Jaszczolt (p.c.), are a case of indirect reports. We occasionally reconstruct a verb of saying, as that (sometimes) appears to be the only evidence we might gather in favor of attributing that belief to

John. (2) might be regarded as an implicit indirect report, according to Elisabeth Holt (2015) (who actually offers different examples), if, in context, we understand that what the speaker says is that John said he is happy.

If such considerations – or elaborations thereof - are accepted, a further step is to say that in a number of cases we need explicatures that specify a verb of saying and a subject (an actor). In this paper, I will expatiate on the important consequences of the considerations by Jaszczolt and Holt, by applying them to the substitution problem for simple sentences (Saul 2007) and to a puzzling case of presupposition evaporation in Scott Soames (2002).

Simple sentences can sometimes be contexts for failure of substitution of co-extensive expressions.

(3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.

Replacing Clark Kent with Superman in (3) clearly produces a false statement.

(4) Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent.

Replacing Clark kent with Superman in (4) generates a false statement (one cannot leap more buildings than oneself).

Saul (2007) rejects some fixing treatments by Predelli, Forbes and Alex Barber (which I will discuss in passing) and offers a psychological experiment showing that retrieving stories may well involve keeping two nodes or files for different (coextensive) names (actually, in the experiment, a name and a coextensive definite description). Although the considerations by Jennifer Saul are of theoretical interest, they are not conclusive.

However, if we admit an embedding explicature in examples such as (3) and (4) we immediately show that these can be intentional contexts that block substitution.

(5) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out

(6) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent.

An objection by Manuel García-Carpintero:

the story need not say anything about the character going in or out a phone booth.

I suppose the author has in mind a scenario in which a speaker says:

(3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out

without relying on the frame of the story (we all know). But this is the situation of the unenlightened (Saul 2007), which is easy to explain because, according to the unenlightened, Clark Kent and Superman need not be co-extensive and thus he would naturally take (3) and (4) to have different truth-conditions.

I suppose this reply does not suffice for Jennifer Saul, who in p.c. writes that I should spell out in a more detailed way that the story may not e.g. contain the claim that Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent. I suppose that both Garcia-Carpintero and Jennifer Saul have in mind some reaction by someone who had read the story or who has watched the film, who says: "Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent". The narrator of the story never said that and this appears to be an inference by the reader/recipient of the story (or film). In such a context, the explicature (We are told that) superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent cannot be constructed/calculated. Nevertheless, the NPs are not inter-substitutable.

There may be two types of answers to this very compelling objection.

It is true that in the story we never encountered the statement 'Superman leaps more tall buildings that Clark kent'. However, for some reason, the speaker is persuaded that this is what he heard or gathered from the story. Thus, although the statement built up through an explicature '(We have been told that) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent' is false, this is what the speaker means and although the statement may appear to someone (but not to him or people like him who are under the impression of having been told such a story that includes this statement (which however was never pronounced)) false, it is not false because of the substitution problem (Superman leaps more buildings than himself). It is false for a different reason.

The other answer.

One does not only say the things literally said, but also the obvious consequences of what was said. This goes back to Higginbotham (p.c.), Capone (2002) (Modal adverbs and discourse) and to Saul (2007). So it is true that the speaker (the story teller) never said 'Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent)', but if we include the obvious consequences of what he said, in a sense (although not in a literal one), he (or she) said: Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent. A problem that may be raised, at this point, is that since this level of what is said mixes both literal meaning and inferences, it cannot guarantee opacity, as opacity (normally) stems from literal sayings. There is something important to this (self)-objection; however, we have already departed from the view that opacity is necessarily linked to literal meanings (literal sayings), as is known from the pragmatic literature on belief reports (including work by Saul and by myself). Since opacity in belief reports is not induced by literal sayings but by pragmatic intrusion, there is no need to think that this objection is cogent (or is more cogent than similar objections to pragmatic treatments of belief reports).

The other possibility is to go along with Saka (see his conference abstract, 2016) that a modal component is part of any assertion. This is known since work by Timothy Williamson or Capone (2002). The difference between Williamson and Saka is that the latter allows intrusion of a component such as 'the speaker is saying' or 'the speaker said'. The proposal by Saka is less contextual than mine – but we have to see all its consequences. One of them, I am afraid, is that in all contexts it is not possible to replace an NP with a coextensive one. In particular, while Leibniz's law applies in general, for the simple cases in which this law applies, Saka would have to provide contextual information that blocks lack of substitutivity which is demonstrated by Saul-like examples. And in default contexts, where there is no information to the contrary, it is not easy to delete this presumption that (coextensive) NPs cannot be intersubstituted.

Now we move on to Soames' problem.

Another problem this type of explicature (in implicit indirect reports) can fix is the one that baffles Scott Soames (2002) on p. 231 (actually pp. 231-33) of his 'Beyond Rigidity'.

Mary has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (the famous philosopher).

But this presupposes she did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel. Therefore, she did not know that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel (since Carl Hempel is coextensive with Carl Hempel). However, she certainly knew (and knows) *apriori* that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel.

This is a problem given that presuppositions are considered (pragmatic) non-cancellable inferences. However, in Macagno and Capone (Forthcoming) (see also Macagno's abstract for the Palermo Conference, May 2016), we showed that in many cases presuppositions are cancellable

inferences being connected with constructions of explicatures. Consider what happens when we construct the plausible explicature:

(1) Mary says she has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

This presupposes that, beforehand, Mary did not believe (or know) that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel. However, this is only a cancellable conversational implicature. Thus, although we are to accept that Mary did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel, this is only a cancellable inference and we need not be committed to the semantic logical form [Mary did not believe that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel], as a pragmatic inference involves deleting whatever elements are in conflict with our world knowledge.

An objection (reasonably) raised by Manuel García-Carpintero is that, after all, we may be in a context in which – although Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Kempel, she never says that she has just learned that. Thus reporting her change of state – the transition from a state is which she does not know that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, the philosopher, to a state in which she comes to know (therefore learns) that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel – without her ever vocalizing that change of state - might be possible. In at least such a context, one must be prepared to say:

(2) Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel

without being able to report:

(3) Mary said she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

However, in such a context it must be true that although did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, it must be true that she is disposed to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (should someone ask her an appropriate question). Thus, although this context is one in which Mary did not not use a verb of saying, holding a

psychological state such as 'learning' (applied to this specific that clause) goes hand to hand with having a disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel. Now suppose we accept that it is not true Mary said that she learned Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, then this can be true either because she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel or because she did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. But of course she knows that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could have never learned that. Thus she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel (even if she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel). But even if she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, this is something she might have said, even if she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could not ignore that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. Since Mary might be inclined to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, on the presupposition that she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, she would not have said that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, as she would have had no motivation to say that, given that if she had said that, she would said something patently false. If Mary had no disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, then it cannot be true that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel.

Marco Carapezza* - Valentina Cuccio**
*Università di Palermo
**Universitat van Amsterdam

LANGUAGE USAGES AND MODES OF REASONING

A long tradition in the Pragmatics of Language has described our linguistic activities as social routines, deeply embedded and modulated by possible

contexts of usage. The Wittgensteinian notion of language games gives an account of how linguistic practices of individuals rely on a social training, which provides a repertoire of tools to draw upon according to the communicative situations.

It has been proposed that the application of the right linguistic routines to each contextual situation implies different modes of relation to the peircean "habit" of action (we will also refer to this notion as "linguistic routine"). Furthermore, in this regard, a huge amount of studies have suggested that the inferential effort involved in language activities is not always the same (Sperber and Wilson). To give an example, novel uses of figurative language often seem to imply more complex socio-cognitive abilities and more sophisticated modes of reasoning than highly standardized linguistic practices. It follows that linguistic usages can imply very different inferential processes that vary from the automatic application of well known routines to the creation *ex novo* of social and linguistic usages.

In this paper we claim that the range of modes of reasoning underpinning linguistic usages can be described according to the notion of abduction proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce, the inferential path that characterizes abduction goes from the result to the rule and from the rule to the case. We propose that linguistic activities follow an analogous path going from the contextual situation (the result) to the law or rule we need to retrieve to act on it. The "case", here, is the application of the linguistic routine to the context.

Interestingly, Peirce identified three different types of abductive inference. In the words of Bonfantini and Proni, the three types of abduction are summarized as follows:

- *Automatic Abduction: the applicable mediation law for inferring a case from a result is mandatory and automatic or semiautomatic;*

- *Abduction by Selection: the applicable mediation law for inferring a case from a result is sought by selection from the available encyclopedia;*

- *Creative Abduction: the applicable mediation law for inferring a case from a result is constituted ex novo, invented* (Bonfantini & Proni, 1980).

In our proposal the vast majority of our linguistic activities implies the automatic retrieval of a habit of action (automatic abduction). Only in few cases we need a more onerous process that leads us to identify the appropriate rule (habit of action/linguistic routine) to be applied to the contextual situation. In these cases, the identification of the appropriate rule can be determined in two different ways, the choice between them being determined by the nature of our background knowledge and our contextual needs. Sometimes, for example when we temporarily live in a foreign country, in many cases the retrieval of linguistic routines is not automatic. Until we become very proficient speakers in a second language and we totally master the culture of the country, relying on our background knowledge, we need to carry out constantly a selection procedure among linguistic routines acquired as second language speakers in order to identify the most appropriate one to apply to each context. In these cases, the inferential process is not automatic and it can be compared to the second type of abduction proposed by Peirce (abduction by selection). In other cases, depending on the context, on our needs and on our background knowledge, we are forced to create *ex novo* a new linguistic routine. The rule to apply in these cases is not available but we are able to elaborate it on the spot. This seems to be the case in some particularly creative contexts. One example for this pragmatic creativity can be observed in children games: sometimes during their games when children face a new situation for which no rule is available, they can create new rules or negotiate new usages of old rules. Another example of creative activities are figurative usages of language: metaphors are often created to fulfil a gap in our linguistic routines. For example, scientists often make use of novel metaphor to explain particular

abstract concept for which no well-established linguistic expressions are available.

Manuel García-Carpintero

LOGOS-Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Universitat de Barcelona

Impli(cat(ur))ed Assertions

Some writers (e.g., Alston (2000, 116-120); Jary (2010, 15-16); Pagin's (2011, 123)) defend accounts of assertion that imply that this act cannot be indirectly made, by requiring that an assertion consists of the communication of the proposition*p by means of a sentence that means p*. I think that this incorrectly makes it definitionally impossible to make assertions of *p* with sentences that mean something else (or even with fully non-linguistic means): in asking 'Who the heck wants to read this book?', I am asserting that (to put it mildly) nobody wants to read it. Aside from direct counterexamples like this, we might ask: why would assertion be special, in that it is the only speech act that cannot be made indirectly? Recently, however, other writers have provided arguments that would provide an answer to this question, and hence would support views of assertion along the indicated lines. While Camp (2006) and Lepore and Stone (2010) have discussed the argument for specific cases, such as metaphorical assertions, Fricker (2012) and Lepore and Stone (2015) provide more general considerations. Fricker makes two main points. First, indirectly conveyed claims would be too ambiguous for the speaker to fully commit to it in the way constitutive of assertions. Second, the audience will have to choose to draw certain inferences and it is thus her, not the speaker that is responsible for the inferences that she chooses to draw, against what is constitutively the case for assertions. The goal of this paper is

to critically examine these arguments, aiming to establish that assertion does not differ from other acts that can be indirectly made.

Eros Corazza

The University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Donostia, The Basque Country;

IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, The Basque Country;

Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, Carleton University, Ottawa ON, Canada

Identity, Doxastic Co-Indexation, and Frege's Puzzle

The first paragraph of Frege's "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) is, no doubt, one of the most discussed pieces in the philosophy of language and mind in the last hundred or so years. It set up much of the subsequent debate. The opening sentence, "Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or sign of objects?" stated the problem and gave rise to what we have come to know as Frege's puzzle.

In his 1892 essay Frege dismissed the way he had treated equality (or identity) in his *Begriffsschrift* (1879) and claimed that the proposal presented there cannot deal with the difference in cognitive significance between an identity statement of the form $a=a$ (e.g. "Tully is Tully" and one of the form $a=b$ (e.g. "Tully is Cicero"). For the former, Frege claims, is trivial and known *a priori*, while the latter can be informative and often known only *a posteriori*.

In this paper I will attempt to show that the so-called Frege's puzzle can be understood on different grounds and that it arises only in taking into consideration the cognizer's viewpoint. This sounds trivial. Yet it entails important consequences, such as: (i) Frege's puzzle has nothing to do with the notion of identity one may bring to the forum from one's metaphysical

toolbox, and (ii) the puzzle rests on whether the speaker/hearer (or writer/reader) *conceives* the names flanking the identity-sign to be co-referential or not (independently of whether they are *de facto* co-referential).

I will show how Frege's attempted solution in the *Begriffsschrift* can be rescued somewhat and that, contrary to appearances, it may not conflict with the solution Frege proposes in 1892 when he introduced the sense/reference distinction. To do so, though, we should recognize that Frege: (i) worked with different (and somewhat conflicting) notions of content and (ii) that he assumed that only a single content expressed by an utterance should encompass all the information conveyed by an identity statement. I will argue that Frege's various notions of content may not be incompatible and that Frege's puzzle, if there is one, arises only in focusing on content *qua* mental content and the way a speaker/hearer interprets the linguistic terms used to express it. To capture this idea I will introduce the notion of doxastic co-indexation and show how it differs from the semantic (or external) co-reference and co-indexation that I characterize as *de facto* co-reference.

Key Words
A Priori/A Posteriori, Cognitive Significance, Co-Reference/Co-Indexation, Frege, Identity.

Denis Delfitto
Università di Verona,

On so-called 'expletive' negation in temporal and comparative clauses

This paper aims at providing substantial evidence for the presence of a logically-driven sentential negation in comparative *than*-clauses and temporal *before*-clauses. First, it is shown that both comparative clauses and *before*-

clauses are associated with inherently negative truth-conditions, directly reflected in the logical forms associated with the corresponding syntactic structures (Seuren 1974, von Stechow 1984, Krifka 2011, Delfitto and Fiorin 2014). Second, an interface condition is proposed, according to which logically negative LFs or truth-conditions license an extra (covert) sentential negation in syntax, which scopallyinteracts with other (covert) negative elements present in the relevant syntactic structure.

On these grounds, we show that so-called expletive negation, as found in comparative *than*-clauses and *before*-clauses in languages such as Italian, whose use is exemplified in (1a-b) below, corresponds in fact to the optional phonological realization of this kind of logically-driven sentential negation.

(1) a.   Sparerà più in alto che non abbia mai fatto prima (from Del Prete 2006)

'He will_shoothigherthaneverbefore'

b.   Lo fermerai prima che non faccia sciocchezze (from Del Prete 2006)

'Youwill stop himbefore he doesanysillything'

The proposed analysis substantially corroborates and significantly extends the analysis of Free Choice *any*(FCA) proposed in Collins & Postal 2015 (C&P), and more generally their analysis of negative polarity *any* as a covert negative element. C&P's approach makes a clear-cut prediction: Every time FCA is found, it must be the case that a covert sentential negation is licensed in syntax. According to our analysis, this prediction is crucially met by comparative clauses and *before*-clauses, which are thus arguably FCA-contexts in virtue of their capacity to license a sentential negation. Moreover, we will discuss evidence in favor of the conclusion that canonical FCA-contexts, i.e. modal contexts expressing possibility, are also associated to logically negative truth-conditions.

We will further argue that in German *bevor*-clauses as in (2), essentially interpreted as in (3), 'expletive' negation in the *bevor*-clause simply corresponds to another instance of our logically-driven sentential negation,

which can thus be optionally realized phonologically, as in Italian temporal and comparative clauses.

(2) Mozart vollendete sein Requiem nicht bevor er nicht nach Wien umzog

(3) Mozart vollendete sein Requiem nicht bevor er nach Wien umzog

'Mozart did not finish his Requiem before he movedto Vienna'

The phonological realization of this negation is subjected to different constraints in German and Italian. In particular, we will show, based on Krifka 2010 and Delfitto 2013, that the reason why 'expletive' negation requires a higher negation in German *bevor*-clauses, as exemplified in (2), depends on the fact that the double-negation structure gives rise, through a serious of logical transformations under logical equivalence, to a reading in which negation is only interpreted in the *bevor*-clause, and crucially not in the main clause.

Last but not least, we will propose that logically-driven negation is crucially sensitive to processes of pragmatic enrichment and we will discuss the consequences of the present analysis for a pragmatic vs. syntactic analysis of NEG-raising phenomena (*I don't think that Mary will leave* interpreted as *I think that Mary will not leave*).

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Michael Devitt

University of New York, USA

Sub-sentials

Stainton points out that speakers "can make assertions while speaking sub-sententially." He argues for a "pragmatics-oriented approach" to these phenomena and against a "semantics-oriented approach". In contrast, I argue that a semantics-oriented approach covers *most*, though not all, of the phenomena:most sub-sentential utterances assert a truth-conditional proposition in virtue of exploiting a semantic convention. Thus, there is a convention in English of expressing a thought that a particular object in mind is *F* by saying simply '*F*'.Stainton's main case against a semantics-oriented approach rests on two planks: (A) the assumption that this approach *must* claim that what appears on the surface to be a sub-sentential is, at some deeper level of syntactic analysis, really a sentence; (B) the claim that there is no such syntactic ellipsis in these sub-sentential utterances. I argue that at least one of (A) and (B) must be wrong and probably both are. Nonetheless, *some* sub-sentential utterances semantically assert only a fragment of a truth-conditional proposition. This fragment needs to be pragmatically enriched to

yield a propositional message. To this extent Stainton's pragmatics-oriented approach is correct.

Francesca Di Lorenzo

Università di Palermo

On the normative and engaged dimension of human (communicative and institutional) interactions

Starting from a new, largely shared, understanding of human interaction and its development and evolution in terms of engagement between people, I aim to contribute to this new way of thinking by showing the interpersonal engagement implied in every linguistic and institutional interaction, as emerging from the principal achievements of the pragmatics of communication and, through them, from social ontology.

I will show the normative structure underlying our communicative and institutional exchanges, elucidating how the set of commitments, obligations, duties and rights constraining us, not only as speaking beings but also as institutional ones, arise from this normative structure.

I will also attempt to demonstrate how it is possible, on this basis, to find a naturalistic ground for human rights.

Toward this aim, I will refer to a model of communicative interaction as enacting an implicit normativity embedded in the general cognitive competences of human beings, that I see captured and developed in different ways in perspectives of philosophers such as Grice, Searle and Habermas. While Paul Grice (1989) shows how human interactions are intrinsically governed by underlying normative, rational constraints, such as the Principle of Cooperation and the maxims deriving from it, John Searle (1969) developing John L. Austin's speech act theory, has shown, more specifically, the structure of the constitutive rules which human beings follow in performing speech acts, distinguishing specifically, for each type of illocutionary act, four kinds of constitutive rules: essential, preparatory, sincerity, and propositional content rules.

Along these lines Habermas (1979, 1984, 1990), while placing "understanding in language as the medium for coordinating actions" at the focal point of his theory (ibid., p. 274), also comes to outline a model of communication that looks at the partners in communicative games as

cooperative agents who always commit each other to take a stand on the validity claims advanced in every performance of speech acts. He works out a discourse ethics (1990) whose core can be identified in the important thesis that the intersubjective recognition and acceptance of speech acts in communicative exchanges are only rational if they are based on a rationally motivated assent to the validity claims advanced by speakers.

Making explicit, in this way, the normative and engaged dimension of human communicative interactions, where duties, rights and obligations concern all the participants, we will finally be able to see how the mutual recognition of all the interlocutors as endowed with equal rights and dignity is also implicit in every communicative interaction.

These philosophical achievements on the normativity and engagement of human interactions, also coherent with the growing attention recently paid to a kind of normativity underlying our competence to take part in the collective practices, both communicative and institutional, of our community (De Souza, 2012; Varela, 1999; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1990), can find some important confirmations in the achievements of contemporary biology concerning the homeostatic and homeodynamic mechanisms of self-regulation governing organism-environment interactions (Thompson, 2007). In light of such findings, it seems plausible to me to see rules and principles governing communicative and institutional agency as expressions of the functional equilibriums intrinsic to human activities. If each organism has its optimal conditions of activity and its proper manner of realizing equilibrium in its context so that we can comprehend every vital structure in relation to norms (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, pp. 148, 154) we can certainly propose a naturalistic understanding of human engagement and normativity, but we also can, beyond every reductionism, still distinguish the human interactions from the interactions between simple organisms, recognizing the salient feature of human beings, under this aspect, in their capacity, through their awareness, of "turning their functional equilibriums" – we could say in Piaget's words – into "properly understood norms" (Piaget, 1971).

Igor Douven

Sorbonne University

Interpreting the Evidence against Centering

According to Inferentialism, the truth of a conditional requires a (not necessarily deductive) inferential connection between its antecedent and its consequent. Among other things, this implies that, unlike any other semantics of conditionals, Inferentialism does not validate Centering, the principle that allows us to infer 'If A, B' from the joint truth of A and B. Psychologists have recently found massive violations of Centering in experimental studies of reasoning, albeit that not all violations are as predicted by Inferentialism. In my talk, I try to answer the question of whether these recent findings are best to be interpreted as bearing on the semantics or rather on the pragmatics of conditionals, and if the former, whether they can be held to be evidence for Inferentialism.

Angela rosa Fabio,
Università di messina

Alessandra Giorgi
"Ca' Foscari" University of Venice

The syntax-prosody interface and the distribution of topic and focus in the left periphery of the clause

Rizzi (1997) and several other scholars argued that the left periphery of the clause – i.e., in Romance, the syntactic space preceding a preverbal subject – is the locus for the syntactic realization of phrases expressing (certain kinds of) given and new information, in particular, in Italian, Clitic Left Dislocation – CLLD – and contrastive focus.Both the syntax associated with these phrases – cf. for instance Cinque(1990) and Frascarelli (2000) – and their peculiar prosodical properties – cf. among the many others Bocci (2012), Frascarelli

(2000), and Samek-Lodovici (2015) – have been object of much scholarly debate.

In this work, I argue that the syntactic and prosodical properties associated with them are not simply two disjoint sets of formal objects, but are deeply interconnected. I propose that the syntactic representation includes *prosody-oriented heads*, i.e., heads whose function is not to express a lexical content, at least not primarily, but are read at the syntax-phonology interface as special instructions for realizing the peculiar intonation associated withleft peripheral phrases.

In particular, in this work I discuss CLLD in Italian. These phrases exhibit some puzzling syntactic properties – most notably, the fact that they turn out *not* to be moved in the left peripheral position, but to be base generated there –which so far were simply stipulated. Moreover, CLLD quite unexpectedly contrasts with left peripheral focus, which, on the contrary, turns out to be moved, according to the main tests, in that position. I show that the presence of *prosody-oriented heads* in the syntax crucially contributes in explaining these, and other,observations in a natural way.I also argue that this proposal accounts for many properties of parentheticals and of certain adverbial clauses as well.

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Graeme Forbes

University of Colorado

Pragmatic accounts of free-choice disjunction

Free-choice disjunction manifests itself in complements of comparatives, existential modals, and related contexts. For example, "Socrates is older than Plato or Aristotle" is usually understood to mean "older than each", not "older than at least one". Normally, to get an "at least one" reading, a wh-rider has to be appended, e.g., "whichever is younger" or "but I don't remember which". Similarly, "Socrates could have been a lawyer or a banker" usually means "Socrates could have been a lawyer and (not "or") could have been a banker". And "Socrates needs an umbrella or a raincoat" is normally understood in a way that isn't synonymous with "Socrates needs an umbrella or Socrates needs a raincoat". Roughly, the reading is "getting a satisfactory umbrella would meet his need and getting a satisfactory raincoat would meet his need".

These examples all have "conjunctive force" and the question I address is whether there's a satisfactory pragmatic account of why the force is with them. I will present a simple Gricean argument that the "co-operative speaker" assumption, added to a disjunctive literal meaning, produces conjunctive force. This works well only for a limited range of cases. I will consider this and other pragmatic accounts and I propose to argue that their limitations support a semantic approach instead.

Mitch Green

University of Connecticut

Organic Meaning

Philosophers of language, as well as those who have been (perhaps unduly) influenced by them such as many students of human facial expression and of animal communication, have difficulty explaining the sense in which inadvertent human scowls, canid tail-wagging and piloerection, anuran warning coloration, and nuptial feeding in katydids, are meaningful. Even those inured to the central tenets of cognitive ethology will pause at the imputation of reflexive communicative intentions to, say, insects; yet the communicative behavior of non-human animals is not aptly classed as natural meaning, not least because it can be deceptive and thus fails the factivity criterion for that primitive form of meaning. In this presentation I will develop some concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication to articulate a notion of organic meaning, in which signals are designed to convey information but where design could as well be due to evolution through natural selection or cultural evolution as to intention. I then assess the utility of organic meaning by applying it to examples such as the above, and close with a discussion of its prospects for illuminating aspects of the evolution of natural language as well as expressive behavior in our own and other species.

Alison Hall

De montfort University, Leicster,

On the psychological reality of explicature

This talk will consider recent objections to the contextualist idea that the explicature of an utterance is partly recovered by pragmatic processes that are not linguistically mandated. I respond to Borg's (2012, forthcoming) arguments that the notion of explicature is ill-defined with characterizations

of explicature given by contextualists pulling apart, and focus especially on her criticism of the use of truth-value judgments as a criterion for individuating explicature (ibid.; Corsentino 2012; Carston & Hall 2012).

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Yan Huang

University of Auckland, New Zeland

Unarticulated Constituents (UCs) and Neo-Gricean Pragmatics

In recent years, the concept of unarticulated constitutes (UCs) has generated a heated debate in both the philosophy of language and linguistic semantics and pragmatics (see e.g. Recanati 2002, Stanley 2002, Marti 2006, Hall 2008). By UCs is meant a propositional or conceptual constitute of a sentence that is not linguistically explicitly expressed in that sentence. Stock examples include (i) *It's summer* [where], (ii) *John is ready* [for what] and (iii) *Mary has a* [what kind of]*brain*.The focus of the debate is that given that context affects truth-conditional content of a sentence uttered, whether the contextual effects should be accounted for in semantic or pragmatic terms. According to the semantic view, contextual effects can be traced to a hidden, implicit or covert contextual indexical, variable or parameter in the syntax or at logical form (LF). By contrast, from a pragmatic perspective, they cannot be

so reduced. Rather, the recovery of the contextual effects is the result of the operation of certain (optional) pragmatic mechanisms. Three important issues are involved in the study of UCs: (i) do UCs exist, (ii) how the semantic content of UCs is recovered, and (iii) what is the pragmatic enrichment involved in the recovery of UCs?

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, given that UCs have not received any systematic treatment in neo-Gricean pragmatics, I'll fill the gap by providing a neo-Gricean account of the type of examples like (i) - (iii) in terms of Horn's (2004) R- or Levinson's (2000) I-principle, taking into account the Gricean distinction between generalised conversational implicature (GCI) and particularised conversational implicature (PCI). Secondly, I shall defend the Levinsonian neo-Gricean position that the pragmatic enrichment of UCs in these examples is neither an explicature (Sperber and Wilson), nor part of the pragmatically enriched said (Recanati), nor an implicture (Bach),but a neo-Gricean, 'pre'-semantic conversational implicature. The reasons are threefold. In the first place, the pragmatic enrichment that is required to recover the semantic content of UCs is engendered largely by the same Gricean pragmatic mechanism that yields a standard 'post-'semantic conversational implicature. Secondly, currently there is no reliable test either in theoreticalor experimental pragmatics that can be used to distinguish alleged explicature, the pragmatically enriched saidor implicture from conversational implicature. Thirdly, given the metatheoretical principle known as 'Occam's razor', a unified implicature analysis is both conceptually and methodologically preferable, because it postulates fewer theoretical categories than its competitors.

My conclusions are (i) there are genuine UCs, (ii) the semantic content of UCs is pragmatically recovered via the R/I-principle in neo-Gricean pragmatics, and (iii) the pragmatic enrichment involved is a 'pre-'semantic conversational implicature. Time permitting, I shall also comment on the alternative semantic analysis.

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Minyao Huang
University of Cambridge

Levels of self-awareness and de se *thoughts*

De se thoughts are often understood as thoughts about oneself that one would express by the first-person pronoun 'I'. After Castaneda, Perry, Kaplan, and many others, this category of thoughts has beencharacterised by their causal powers to initiate self-oriented actions and beliefs, which distinguish them from thoughts about someone that happens to be oneself. In

Perry's famous example, the messy shopper initially thought that someone was making a mess without knowing that it was him. His behaviour changed when he realised that, '*I* am making a mess'. The 'I'-thought prompted his behaviour as a result of the immediate self-awareness it encodes, which is missing in the initial thought that is unknowingly about himself.

In this talk I suggest that the kind of self-awareness that has traditionally characterised *de se* thoughts pertains to the psychologically 'lower' level of self-awareness, roughly awareness of the self in here-and-now situations. Drawing on psychological models on the cognitive development of self-awareness, I argue that *de se* thoughts can also involve higher levels of self-awareness such as awareness of the self in the past and the future, awareness of the self in conceptually-specified roles and characteristics. Moreover, I demonstrate that different levels of self-awareness lead todifferent kinds of self-oriented behaviours. In other words, 'I'-thoughts appear to be causally efficacious in different ways, depending on the levels of self-awareness they encode. I discuss the implication of the levels of self-awareness for the semantics of the first-person indexical 'I' and for the cross-linguistic variation in the semantic functions that first-person forms can assume.

K.M. Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge

Indexicals: From Pragmatics to Semantics

Contextualist accounts acknowledge the fact that word meaning can undergo syntactically unconstrained modification that affects the content of the truth-evaluable representation (e.g. Recanati 2012a, b, Jaszczolt 2010, in press). It has even been claimed that (i) retaining the basic, 'linguistic' meaning is not a norm but rather a special case, or even that there is no such thing as a basic linguistic meaning but rather meaning is established on an

occasion of use. A radical contextualist perspective puts into question the distinction between indexical and non-indexical expressions (Kaplan 1989) in that all words are, in a sense, indexical: their meaning is at least potentially heavily context-dependent.

In this paper I focus on the utility of the concept of an indexical expression for natural-language semantics. First, indexicals can also adopt the role of non-indexical expressions and, on the other hand, non-indexicals frequently perform a function of indexical, directly referential expressions.Kaplan distinguished expressions that have context-sensitive character allowing for fixed content that does not differ with circumstances of evaluation (indexicals, e.g. 'I', 'you', 'here', 'now') and expressions that have fixed character, allowing for content that differs with circumstances of evaluation (non-indexicals, e.g. common nouns). But Kaplan's distinction does not give due attention to the most problematic fact about natural languages, namely that there are no natural-language equivalents of indexicals: indexicals are roles rather than linguistic objects, and are only arrived at in the process of analysing utterance meaning allowing for top-down, unconstrained modification.

The question arises as to whether the fact that indexicals are a philosophers' fiction poses a problem for the analysis of natural-language meaning. I conclude that it does not, but only when we 'pragmaticise' indexicality and anchor it to roles rather than linguistic expressions. I adopt a contextualist stance in which unconstrained modifications are regarded as a natural step in semantic analysis. This discussion thus sheds some light on the minimalism/contextualism debate, showing that the flexibility of meaning of what is commonly regarded as an indexical necessitates a pragmatics-rich, contextualist stance.

Next, I point out that the distinction is problematicfor languages with a rich system of honorificationin that the social aspects of meaning cannot be separated from the truth-conditional content. It is also problematic for a variety of other languages in which the concept of a pure indexical is graded and realised as different degrees of, for example, expressing the self or expressing the temporal and spatial location. I conclude with some remarks on Kaplan' 'monster operators', arguing that as a corollary of the fact that indexicality is a pragmatic phenomenon, the problem with fixing reference to the current act of speech (the Fixity Thesis, Schlenker 2003) does not arise. I offer here new analysis of the evidence from Amharic that puts into question the current view that Amharic data can be explained by a context-shift.

I conclude that the indexical-nonindexical distinction seems to be blurred not only on the level of natural-language realisations of the concept of an indexical but also on the conceptual level itself, in that the directly referring function cannot be easily dissociated from a variety of other truth-conditionally relevant meanings that expressions functioning as indexicalsconvey. It follows that semantic representations of 'indexical expressions' have to make use of the pragmatic route to their meaning.

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Istvan Kecskes

State University of New York, Albany

Levels of interpretation in intercultural data

Recently there have been attempts in linguistic pragmatics to fine-tune the distinction between levels of interpretation (e.g. Jaszczolt 2009; Moeschler 2007; Sternau et al. 2015; Ariel 2002, and forthcoming). Experimental data were used by Sternau et al. (2015) and Ariel (forthcoming) to investigate the pragmatic status and psychological reality of four levels of interpretation: linguistic meaning, explicature, strong implicature, and weak implicature.Their studies tested the potential of these four levels to constitute the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, which is the primary

interpretation of an utterance as intended by the speaker and understood by the addressee.

This paper examines how the application of these approaches to intercultural data video-recorded and produced in real time may help us better understand the way Privileged Interactional Interpretation emerges in intercultural interaction. The study aims to answer the following questions:

1)Is explicature the core level of interpretation in intercultural data? How do the latest findings on intercultural data broaden the scope of understanding explicatures and modify its relationship to bare linguistic meaning?

Present research in intercultural interactions states that the most salient interpretation for non-native speakers is usually the propositional meaning of an utterance (e.g. Abel 2003; Bortfeld, 2002, 2003; Cieslicka, 2004, 2006; House 2002, 2003; Kecskes 2007). So interpretation generally depends on what the utterance says rather than on what it actually communicates.

2) Based on what background information do nonnative speakers make their implications? How dotarget language background information and L1 background information interact in shaping implicatures?

3) How does real time natural language data affect our understanding of truth conditions (see Sedivy 2007)? Carston(2008:342) stated that "…the dominant view of semantics as dealing in truth conditions, while appropriate for thought, is largely eroded when it is applied to natural

language representations, …".

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Francesco La Mantia

University of Palermo

Compositionality and lexical polysemy

Compositionality of meaning is a much debated topic in logic and philosophy of language. Recent works on computational linguistics have raised specific objections to some fundamental aspects of the principle. The primary insight of compositionality, according to which the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of its constituents (and by its structure) would be significantly scaled if the scientific reflection on the natural language took into account the phenomena of lexical polysemy. The standard compositional models of meaning seem to rest on two epistemological assumptions that trivialize or totally reject the theoretical value of these phenomena. It is believed that a) the elementary constituents of any complex expression are carriers of unique and invariant meanings; b) the meaning of each compound is constructed from these meanings. The first assumption - or condition of *semantic atomism* - is a prerequisite implicitly shared by many formal semantics: the meaning of a complex expression *can be determined* by the meaning of its constituents (and by its structure) because each constituent has meaning in isolation, i.e. regardless of expressive contexts in which it occurs. Otherwise, there would be nothing to composite because constituents having no independent meaning cannot effectively

contribute to the genesis of the compositional meaning. The second assumption states that the standard compositional models of meaning are able to be reduced to bottom-up models of computation: the compositional genesis of meaning proceeds from the parts towards the whole.

Most of these assumptions are reversed in the contexts of generalized polysemy that are a constant regularity of the formal apparatus of any natural language. What emerges is a different linguistic situation where the polysemy of lexical units reverses apparently stable and invariant "whole-parts" dependencies. The elementary constituents of any complex expression, except in rare and controversial cases of pure monosemy, have no meaning in isolation but rather are a vehicle for multiple and heterogeneous meanings that are activated within appropriate propositional contexts. The *context-sensitive* nature of lexical constituents has, at a semantic level, two important consequences: a^1) the local meanings, far from being understood in isolation, are the result of finely distributed interactions between the constituents and the expressive contexts in which constituents occur; b^1) the bottom-up models of computation alternate with top-down models, i.e. with semantic computations that are oriented from the top to the bottom, or, equivalently, from the whole into the parts.

The purpose of my talk is twofold: first, to evaluate the cognitive plausibility of top-down models of semantic computation; second, to preserve the primary insight of compositionality despite the supposed cognitive plausibility of these computation models. In other words, I will try to consistently integrate two kinds of semantic facts: the fact that the meaning of a whole rests on the meaning of its parts and the fact that the meanings of the parts are *context-sensitive*.

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Paolo Leonardi

Università di Bologna

Use and descriptions

Reference and referring can speak of an act, something that naturally looks pragmatic, as of a semantic relation, typically that names and demonstrative have with the objects they name and demonstrate. Famously, 50 years ago, Keith Donnellan claimed that there are two uses of a description, a referential and an attributive one. Not that the facts were unknown or controversial, but the main accounts available in 1966, that is Bertrand Russell's and Peter Strawson's, privileged one the attributive use and the other the referential one – Russell, say, goes semantical and Strawson pragmatical. Donnellan speaks of uses, neither of meanings nor of speech acts, characterizing the referential use as finding a description appropriate to a thing, and the attributive one as finding a thing appropriate to a description. Donnellan's approach to referential uses of descriptions has a consequence that almost everyone has found controversial. Looking for the appropriate description of

a thing does not warrant producing a true description of it – I may mistake some traits of what I am referring to, or may think my audience being mistaken about them, and wanting them to catch what I am speaking about care more to warrant their understanding than truth, or just be too delicate an issue to speak the truth. And yet, however I describe the thing, I can predicate something true of it. I shall sketch two ways to account for Donnellan's views, an ambiguity one, first suggested in Bell 1973, and a use theory one which renounces that ambiguity. The ambiguity account claims the referential use to be appositive, and the attributive one to be restrictive. The use alternative, which I prefer, makes the referential cases central to fixing the meaning of words, and the controversial cases occasions for linguistic change, a view that is not too far from the last lines of Kripke's famous paper criticizing Donnellan, where he writes: In particular, I find it plausible that a diachronic account of the evolution of language is likely to suggest that what was originally a mere speaker's reference may, if it becomes habitual in a community, evolve into a semantic reference. And this consideration may be one of the factors needed to clear up some puzzles in the theory of reference. (Kripke 1977: 271) Indeed, successful referential uses in which the description seems not to fit what is referred to are the occasion for such an evolution.

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Fabrizio Macagno

Universidade nova de Lisboa

Presuppositions, polyphony, and the problem of implicit commitments.

The problem of presupposition suspension (Heim, 1992) can be analyzed from an argumentative point of view in terms of attribution of implicit commitments (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). An utterance carries a set of implicit commitments (Hamblin, 1970), which are usually attributed to both the speaker and the hearer. Such propositions can be taken for granted (Stalnaker, 1973) only because the speaker can presume reasonably that they are shared by the hearer. However, determining to what "voice" or linguistic character can be held committed to a specific proposition expressed by an utterance is sometimes complex. An utterance can involve several voices expressing propositions that are reported. In such cases, the implicit commitments resulting from the presupposed propositions cannot be attributed to the speaker; instead, a more complex reconstruction is needed. The interpreter needs to retrieve the non-presumptive meaning through an abductive process that can be modeled through argumentative reasoning patterns (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008).

The focus of this paper is on some cases of presupposition suspension, which can be regarded as the marks or signs of a non-presumptive polyphonic reading of an utterance (Ducrot, 1980, 1984). The polyphonic articulation of an utterance at different levels can be used to explain cases in which presuppositions are suspended(Capone, 2009; Macagno & Capone, 2015). Presuppositional suspensions indicate that the presumptive reading does not hold, and a different interpretation is needed. Utterances can display various types of polyphonic structures, accounting for the speaker's and the hearer's commitments. While a speaker can be held directly responsible for what is says, he is committed only indirectly to what he presupposes, i.e. what is uttered by a second voice (the second utterer or enunciator) representing what the common opinion (and, therefore, the

speaker and the hearer) accepts to be true. The reconstruction of the pragmatic structure of an utterance is guided by a complex type of reasoning, which can be represented as an argumentative abductive pattern, grounded on hierarchies of presumptions. By comparing the possible presumptions associated with the explicit meaning and the contextual information, the hearer can find a best possible explanation of the intended effect of the utterance.

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Marco Mazzone
Università di Catania, IT

Mental state attribution in pragmatics.
The indeterminacy issue

The problem of indeterminacy in mental state attribution is a topic of discussion at least since the debate between Dennett (1981; 1987; 1991) and Fodor (1986; 1991). Specifically, Dennett appealed to semantic holism and the indeterminacy of meaning in order to argue for his thesis that mental states with determinate contents are just a matter of attribution by others – in his opinion, there is no fact of the matter as to which is *the real intention* driving the action of an agent. The claim that the content of intentions (and other mental states) is to some extent indeterminate has a certain plausibility of its own, although this does not necessarily imply that mental states can only be attributed by others, and have no genuine causal role to play in cognition – a position that I have defended in Mazzone (2010; in press; Mazzone and Campisi 2013).

Since, according to Gricean pragmatics, communication is based on entertaining, conveying and recognizing communicative intentions, we can expect that the issue of indeterminacy may surface in this research area, as well. As a matter of fact, two recent papers address it with quite different approaches and purposes: Cummings (2014), Sperber and Wilson (unpublished).

My aim is to consider these recent perspectives on indeterminacy in pragmatics and compare them with my own view. Specifically, Cummings (2014) has made a very clear case for indeterminacy in pragmatic interpretation, but her anti-theoretical conclusions seem too extreme. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson (unpublished) propose a quite convincing account of how an "impression", that is, the manifestness of an array of propositions none of which has to be distinctly entertained by the speaker, can produce sufficiently determined inferences and related behaviours.

According to Sperber and Wilson, these considerations suggest that many (if not all) inferences can be best described as competitions between

alternative conclusions rather than as standard logical derivations. I want to expand this conclusion by proposing that this is only one aspect of the need to turn away from a propositionalist account of cognition. There is a delicate balance between the irreplaceable role of language in providing explanations of our mental life and the fact that mental life is much more complicated – though possibly less sophisticated (less "complex" in the sense of Geurts and Rubio-Fernández unpublished) – than such explanations can be. The rational reconstructions by which Grice explained utterance understanding are just a case in point.

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Friederike Moltmann

CNRS-IHPST and NYU

Sentences as Predicates of Attitudinal and Modal Objects

The standard view in philosophy of language is that sentences stand for propositions that serve as the objects of propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts, such as assertions. In this talk I will give a range of linguistic and philosophical arguments for an alternative view. According to that view, sentences do not stand for propositions, but rather serve to (partially) characterize a variety of attitudinal and modal objects, such as assertions, requests, beliefs, decisions, permissions and obligations. This account will shed a very different light on the semantics-pragmatics divide in that sentences no longer need to provide 'unarticulated constituents' and alike to complete a proposition as the object of an illocutionary act or mental attitude.

Michael Nelson

UC-Riverside

Space, Time, and Modality

At a sufficiently general level, spatial, temporal, and modal modifiers function in similar ways, transforming what, left unmodified, would be false/true sentences into true/false sentences. So, while there is beer, and

beer a plenty, there isn't beer in the fridge. While George isn't sleeping, he was sleeping. While I live in California, I might have lived somewhere else instead. This commonality, however, masks a deeper difference, I argue. I defend a relativist account of temporal and modal modifiers, according to which they are genuine operators on the mode of truth of the unmodified sentence. The proposition expressed by the unmodified sentence, then, is true at one set of indices (the present time and the actual world) and the operators shift these indices (to a past time and a merely possible world). Because the constitution of reality -- how things are -- is itself irreducibly perspectival, there being no complete, all-encompassing, God's-eye, absolute perspective from which reality is constituted, this form of relativism better respects the deep connection between truth and meaning than an absolutist, monadic theory of truth. This is because, I claim without defending, the most promising accounts of change across time, both qualitative and quantitative, and contingency treat times and worlds as relativizing the instantiation relation between a thing and its properties. By contrast, spatial modifications function not as sentential or propositional operators but as adjuncts. There are a variety of ways of implementing this idea. In the most simple-minded version, the restrictor 'x is beer' is modified to 'x is beer in the fridge'. The quantifier 'there is' remains unrestricted, with the most inclusive of domains as its domain. On less simple-minded versions, the domain of quantification itself is restricted to the universe in the fridge and the restrictor remains unmodified as 'x is beer'. On neither version, however, is the truth of the fully unrestricted proposition [there is some x: x is beer] true relative to the universe as a whole and false relative to my fridge, an thesis that barely makes sense.

   Underneath the commonality between temporal and modal modifiers and the roles times and worlds play as indices of truth is another important difference, I argue. Both worlds and times function as indices of truth. The metaphysical correlate of this thesis is that a thing instantiates a property not

absolutely but only from the perspective of a time and a world. But there is an important difference between the different times and worlds themselves, the focus of the debate between so-called presentists and eternalists, on the temporal side, and actualists and possibilitists, on the modal side. While all other times are ``equally real,'' in a sense I will try to make more precise below, merely possible worlds are all constructs from actually existing entities. Socrates does not presently exist. But he is an individual as much as you and I are individuals. The proposition that Socrates was snubbed nose is presently true and is a fully singular proposition, a proposition with Socrates himself as a constituent, as much as the proposition that I was standing is a fully singular proposition, a proposition with me myself as a constituent. (I think that the same is also true of propositions about wholly future objects, although we are, typically if not universally, not cognitively related to these propositions to grasp them.) This means that there are, in the most inclusive sense of 'there are', wholly past and future objects. By contrast, there are not, even in the most inclusive sense of 'there are', merely possible individuals. There are general truths, like the truth that it is possible that there is something distinct from every actually existing object, but there are not correlate singular truths, truths of the form it is possible that o is distinct from every actually existing object, supporting those truths. So, while both times and worlds, both present and non-present times and actual and non-actual worlds alike, function as perspectives from which a thing has a property, there being no absolute ``having'' relation between properties, even perfectly intrinsic properties, and a thing, the most inclusive domain of quantification is world but not time relative.

I argue that these metaphysical and semantic theses cannot be pried apart. An investigation into whether truth is monadic or relative cannot be carried out absent a stance on the metaphysical theses concerning the nature of time, change, modality, and contingency. Conversely, the metaphysical investigations require corresponding semantic theses concerning the nature

of truth and what kinds of modifiers are genuine operators and which mere adjuncts of some form.

Neal R. Norrick
Universität des Saarlandes

Storytelling, the transmission of knowledge and more

In my contribution I will consider how stories may transmit knowledge amidst displays of credibility and evaluation with the help of engaged listeners in everyday talk.

Fricker (2006) investigates the speech act of telling and the relationships between telling, testimony, speakers and hearers. She stresses the importance of the trustworthiness of the teller for the credibility of testimony. Missing from her discussion is an account of how tellers establish their epistemic justification for telling (Sacks 1972) and their trustworthiness in the telling performance. Looking at real data we see tellers are often at pains to establish their first-hand knowledge or at least the trustworthiness of their second-hand knowledge in various ways. Surprisingly, at the same time, storytellers fairly frequently register doubts regarding their own memories and descriptions, but these displays differ from the indexes of fabrication. Such matters one can only explore through conversation analysis of real spoken data, and it is just such an approach taken in my contribution.

Further, what Fricker means by telling is essentially just asserting. Her main interest is in the nature of second-hand knowledge—coming to know by being told and trusting the teller. She does not consider storytelling as such, though she talks about testimony. But much of what we hear in everyday stories is not testimony, it does not transmit knowledge as such.

Instead it is evaluation (Labov 1972), tellers positioning themselves vis-à-vis characters and events in their narratives. Much telling time is taken up with establishing reference and expressing attitudes toward people and places, accessory to the sort of details that would usually be considered the knowledge imparted by a story.

But the biggest oversight in philosophical approaches to speech acts, including storytelling, is the role of the listener. Especially in storytelling the audience/listener plays a key role, first, because the teller must obtain the floor for an extended turn while the other participants become listeners; second, because the narrative is designed for the particular audience; and third, because listeners actively contribute: completing utterances; contributing words and phrases incorporated by teller; questioning, rejecting descriptions; engaging in sub-sequences, questioning the teller regarding references and assumptions, often with truth-functional significance for the story in progress.

In my contribution, I will illustrate how conversational narratives depart from simple assertions and testimony, regarding teller strategies and goals as well as the substantial role of the audience, and go on to outline research desiderata.

Vahid Parvaresh
University of Theran

Indirect Reports of the Self

Indirect reports have been a topic of research over the past few years (see Capone, 2010, 2012; Capone *et al.*, 2015). As opposed to a direct report, which "evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims to convey, the

exact words of the original speaker", an indirect report"adapts the reported utterance to the speech situation of the report" (Coulmas, Cited in Holt, 2015, p. 168).As situated activities (Mey, 2001), indirect reports are normally expected to "provide sufficient contextual clues for the recovery of the original speech act" (Capone, 2010, p. 379). There are, however, occasions in which the boundaries between direct and indirect reports are so fuzzy that it would be impossible to distinguish between the two (Holt, 2015). Glosses - brief and general explanations of a previous locution –constitute one such occasion. Drawing on a naturally occurring corpus of Persian conversations, in this presentation I will examine what I call 'self-reporting', situations in which the reporter is the same as the reported speaker. Along the way, I will characterize the nature of such an interaction and explain how it is maintained during conversation.

Antonino Pennisi – Alessandra Falzone

University of Messina – Department of Cognitive Sciences

Cognitive Pragmatics and Evolutionism: Language at the test of a Theory of Performativity

Within the scientific landscape of cognitive pragmatics, some authors (Bara 2010, Sperber & Origgi 2010) have tried to identify in pragmatics an adaptative function useful for natural selection of language. This work is part of this field of studies and proposes a new theoretical hypothesis on the cognitive role played by performativity. We will support the idea that language is not only a set of abstract computational rules but first and foremost a procedure completely redetermined by the ways it is performed. These ways depend on the central and peripheral anatomical structures (supralaryngeal vocal tract, brain areas and neural control systems), on the realontogenetic realization of the linguistic development, and on the daily

phenomenic practice of speech. Therefore, the target of natural selection is not the generic and abstract combinatorial capacity, which hasn't any adaptative function taken alone, but the actual language activity which goes through the pragmatic competence from the phonemes articulation to the speech production. Ultimately, the evolutionary pathways that allowed sapiens to be the only animal species able to produce articulated voice had affected selection in two different ways: first they selected the morphological constraints that make language possible (but not necessarly performed) and in a second evolutionary moment they selected the performativity of articulatory action which produced the adaptiveness of verbal communication. If this hypothesis is true it is necessary to widen the theoretical dimension of pragmatics to the articulatory production, rooting it to experimental studies both on human and non-human auditory-vocal learning and on the autonomous cognitive role of performative component.

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Paola Pennisi

Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Fisiologia Clinica (IFC-CNR), Messina

Can Relevance Theory explain autistic deficits in prosody?

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is classified among developmental pragmatic disorders (DPD) (Cummings 2009; 2014). In ecological contexts, it

is often found in subjects with ASD a great difficulty to infer information about the content of a message on the basis of extra-linguistic clues like as faces and voices. (Harms et al. 2010; Demouy et al. 2011; Diehl et al. 2008). In this paper, it will be discussed the difficulties of autistic subjects in understanding and using prosody to infer the speaker's meaning. Wilson & Wharton (2006), recovering the Hauser distinction between *signs* and *signals* in animal communication (Hauser 1996), suggested that in human transmission of information we can find three kind of inputs: *natural signs* (interpreted inferentially), *natural signals* (interpreted mainly by decoding) and *linguistic signals* (interpreted by a combination of inference and decoding). According to the two authors these three types of inputs exist also in prosody. Our question is, can the existing scientific literature provide empirical support to this theoretical framework?

Different scientific approaches to the study of prosody in subjects with autism show that prosody is not entirely affected in individuals with autism; i.e. Brooks et al. (2013) give some evidences that subjects with ASD seem to possess adequate, sometimes even superior, perception of affective and/or grammatical prosody; Chevallier et al. (2009) showed that adolescent with Asperger Syndrome are able to decide the most appropriate stress pattern for disyllabic words, to correctly chunk compounds on the basis of rhythmic cues and to take into account the prosody of sentence in determining whether it is a statement or a question. We can provide an explanation of these results (partially in contrast with the commonly accepted assumptions about prosodic deficits of subjects with ASD), taking into account the gap in ASD subjects' performances in experimental settings and in ecological contexts for the same types of tasks reported by Kiln et al. (2003). But these contrasting results make clear the need to define more precisely the difficulties of individuals with ASD with prosody.

In our work we will try to analyse the existing scientific literature in order to define more accurately the real level of prosodic deficits in ASD subjects

and we will try to investigate in this direction the theoretical framework draw by Wilson and Wharton (2006).

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Pietro Perconti

Department of cognitive science, University of Messina

A pragmatist view on common sense and cognitive science

Like every other scientific enterprise, cognitive science has an influence on common sense view. In my talk I would like to investigate this influence in order to evaluate the compatibility between folk intuitions and cognitive science findings. The aim is to understand the kind of change common senseshould be subjected in order to be compatible with the scientific worldview. I will show the possibilities of a "pragmatist" attitude, inspired by the idea that common sense has neither an unitary structure nor a speculative intent. It is rather articulated at two different levels: a deep and a superficial level. The words "deep" and "superficial" refers to the degree of change the single level can be subjected to; not to its importance. The deep level consists of know-how procedures, of metaphorical frames based on the imaginative bodily representation, and of a set of adaptive behaviours, like disgust and the feelings of pain and pleasure. On the contrary, superficial level includes culture-dependent beliefs and judgements. They can be true or false: in the end, it is matter of thuth and justifications to offer. In fact, beliefs and judgements are emendable by means of further propositional knowledge."Pragmatistic" account is based on the idea that the deepest level of common sense is oriented toward the efficacy, and not the truth. Furthermore, deep common sense is unavailable for any fast change because it depends on human biology more than on culture conventions. Cognitive science can only appreciate this state of affair: it is useless to attempt to change the deep common sense, as in the case one would like to change the

way human eyes perceive the world. On the contrary, superficial common sense is really challenged by the findings of cognitive science and we should are interested in these changes that are advantageous to deal with new technological and bioethical issues.

Francesca Piazza
Università di Palermo

Not only slurs.
A rhetorical approach to verbal abuse

The current debate about verbal abuse (especially in analytic philosophy) is mainly focused on the linguistic analysis of *slurs,* i.e. derogatory terms targeting individuals or groups on the basis of geographic origin, race, religion, sexual orientation or gender. What is at stake in this debate is the linguistic mechanism responsible for the offensiveness of slurs and, consequently, the semantic/pragmatic features of these particular type of words.

In my paper I intend to propose a different approach to verbal abuse. It is an approach not exclusively focused on a particular type of words, such as slurs, but aimed at understandingthe role of words — all the words — in making violence.

This approach is based on two basic assumptions:

1. The (potential) offensiveness of speech is not specific of slurs (or any other particular type of words);

2. in order to understand the linguistic mechanism responsible for the offensiveness of words we cannot isolate them from our effective practices (that are not only linguistic practices).

I call this approach *rhetorical* because this conception of language as an activity strictly intertwined with non-linguistic practices finds its root in classical rhetoric. In contemporary philosophy we find a similar conception in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and especially in his concept of *language game* as «the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven» (§7). As Wittgenstein himself clarifies in § 23 «here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life». It is exactly for this reason that the concept of *language game* can be useful to understand the offensiveness of words.

In order to clarify the usefulness of this approach to verbal abuse, I will propose an example: the duel in *Iliad.* Indeed, it can be used as a paradigmatic case of violent situation in which speech acts play a constitutive role. More exactly, I intend to show that the so called *flyting* (the verbal exchange between warriors during the duel which is mainly composed of speech acts as *challenging, threatening* and *boasting*) is an essential part of the duel itself and contributes to the effective achievement of violence.

Francesca Poggi

Dipartimento "Cesare Beccaria", Università degli Studi di Milano

Conversational Implicatures of Normative Discourse

Grice (1967) formulated his famous maxims having mainly in mind the assertive discourse, i.e. a discourse which aims to inform, and can be either true or false. However, as it is well known, norms do not aim to inform: they aim to guide behavior, and, therefore, they are neither true nor false. However, Grice conceived of the cooperative principle as a general principle which holds also for non-assertive conversations. Following a classical Gricean approach (although with some modifications), this essay aims to

restate Gricean conversational maxims in order to make them applicable to normative discourse. The restatement will also shed a new light on debated issues of normative discourse, such as the role of the speaker's will, the free choice permission paradox and the relation of sub-contrariety between deontic concepts.

Maria Pia Pozzato

Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Filosofia e Comunicazione

The representation of the place of origin: maps, discourse, emotions

The research is focused on the representations, both visual and linguistic, which people give of their own places of origin. We have made a list of the more relevant aspects, in other terms, which questions to ask to the corpus in order to obtain some answers we are looking for. Some of those answers concern: 1) how the visual language and the oral language integrate each other in the reconstruction of the memory; 2) how people live today the memory of their places of origin, in an era marked by large displacements and diminished sense of place (Meyrowitz 1986); 3) how emotional and cognitive components work together in the reconstruction of the past; 4) how past is expressed through its spatial valence. Interviewees were asked to draw their own place of origin on a white A3 sheet, using either a pencil or a coloured pen, their choice. If they did not remember precisely their native place because they had moved away many years before, they could draw the place they remembered as the scenario of their early childhood. The team is formed by scholars from different disciplines such as Semiotics, Psychology and Geography, because we aimed at understanding these materials from various and interdisciplinary points of view. The semiotic instruments allowed us to describe how each person reconstructs a complex image of

his/her childhood place and how translates personal memories from one language to another e.g. from drawing to verbal story, in the attempt to reach the best form of expression. The cognitive-psychological point of view clarifies the cognitive and emotional world of the interviewees and the reasons of their choices during the process of reconstruction of their childhood experiences. The geographical point of view is more similar, from an epistemological point of view, to the semiotic one. In fact, its conceptualizations have to do with a cultural level: which cartographic models inspire the maps in the drawings? Some maps are inspired by sensorimotor programs ("here I cycled", "this is the road I walked going to school"), other times they are inspired by specific episodes of the childhood ("here it is the church's window I broke with my ball"), or by something which strongly hit the subject ("I drew this tree because it has always been very important to me"). As we shall show, when I will bring specific examples, the more drawn maps are rationally constructed, the more they are comparable with the photographed landscapes of Google maps or with Street View photos; on the contrary, the more maps are subjectively constructed, the less it is reasonable to compare them with the realistic ones. What is questioned is not the accuracy of the drawing but the comparison between a supposed real landscape and a subjective reconstruction of a living environment. Not the Reality itself but the ratio between a subject and what he/she believes it is true (or simply meaningful). During a recent stay at the University of Eugene (Oregon), I collected nineteen maps from students and professors. A good percentage of my students at the University of Bologna comes from abroad. Thus, the comparison between different cultures and background is another of the most interesting aspects of the research. Finally, a member of the team is studying the drawings of deaf and dumb people and it is increasingly clear that people who normally speak sign language draw their places of origin and comment these drawings in a specific way.

François Recanati

CNRS, Paris, FR

Semantic Entry Points for Speaker's Meaning

Contrary to a widespread idealization, grammatical meaning does not determine assertoric content, but merely constrains it. Speaker's meaning necessarily comes into play. In this talk, I am concerned with the extent of the phenomenon. When and where, exactly, does speaker's meaning come into play in fixing assertoric content ?

 Mark Richard

University of Harvard

What do slurs mean, and what does it mean to slur someone?

One thinks that slurs have meanings that are importantly different from the meanings of their "neutral counterparts", so that what is (normally) said by using a sentence in which a slur is used is different from what's said by using the result of replacing the slur with its neutral counterpart. One thinks that the way in which slurs are typically used by speakers --in particular, the sorts of illocutionary acts slurring typically involves --contributes to determining their meaning. And one thinks that the social role of slurs, as being emblematic of prejudice, is in some way related to their meanings -- though whether it is the social role that determines the meaning or the meaning that enables the social role is less than clear.

In this talk I examine a variety of accounts of the meaning of slurs that have been recently offered. I suggest that extant accounts (including one I myself once gave) don't really adequately explain how the illocutions

associated with the use of slurs and the social role of slurs are related to their meaning. I will offer what seems to me a better account.

Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach
The Ohio State University

Beware the consequences! Reconsidering the perlocutionary

Austin's classic characterization of the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts was progressively overshadowed by a focus on the locutionary/illocutionary distinction, beginning with Austin's own observations and in much subsequent work on speech-act theory. Nevertheless, several philosophers (Derrida and Cavell among others) have pointed out that such a strategy might be problematic for a proper understanding of performatives in a broader sense. In this talk, the "repercussion" side of interpretation will be considered, revisiting some of the felicity conditions that have been proposed for the perlocutionary act and addressing several arguments that have been raised against their linguistic import. A reconsideration of the perlocutionary will be argued for, especially in view of recent developments in the study of the development and decay of (linguistic) cognition, relating it to proposals on the theory of mind/executive function continuum.

Yael Sharvit
University of California, UCLA

Tense in FID (Free Indirect Discourse)

It is argued in Sharvit (2008) that there is 'de se' (or 'de nunc') tense in FID. The argument provided there is based on examples from non-Sequence-of-Tense languages, drawing conclusions regarding Sequence-of-Tense languages as well. In this talk I attempt to bridge this gap by providing direct evidence for 'de se' tense in FID, based on data from Sequence-of-Tense languages, non-Sequence-of-Tense languages, and "mixed" languages. This evidence will be shown to challenge recent alternative accounts of tense in embedded clauses which rely either on pragmatic strengthening (e.g., Altshuler & Rothschild, 2013), or quotation (e.g., Maier, 2014). Such alternative accounts not only fail to account for existing language types, but also for similarities and differences between FID and other forms of indirect report.

Paul Saka
University of Texas

Universal Opacity

Jennifer Saul (2007) and others have observed that the following kinds of statement appear to differ in truth-value, despite having co-referential names:

(1)   Superman regularly flies.
(2)   Clark Kent regularly flies.

Yet the names in these 'simple sentences' do not occur in contexts traditionally regarded as opaque. In particular, they do not appear in belief-contexts.

I respond that every assertion of (1) or (2) implies a belief, namely that of the speaker (as recognized by Moore's paradox). Sentences never exist in isolation. They occur as the product of a speech-act, and if we as analysts are

to fully represent or record the speech act then we must refer to its author. The logical forms of our true objects of inquiry, in other words, are:

    (1')   Saul said (or mock-said) that Superman regularly flies.

    (2')   Saul said (or mock-said) that Clark Kent regularly flies.

When a speaker S makes an assertion, S not only expresses a belief, but thereby implicitly reports S's own belief. S can be said to report a belief because S makes known, by verbal means, S's belief. Yet the report does not take the form 'S believes that…' and therefore is not explicit. What we have here, as in the case of all assertion, is an implicit belief report.

Since opacity can be found in explicit belief reports, it's only to be expected that it can be found as well in the implicit belief reports that are provided by simple sentences. To pursue the nature of opacity, I develop a theory of truth that applies to implicit belief reports. My work, rooted in the cognitive semantics of Gilles Fauconnier, George Lakoff, and Ray Jackendoff, shares Saul's psychologistic turn but reaches very different conclusions. Whereas Saul regards (2) as semantically true, and some of her opponents regard it as semantically false, I regard it as both true *and* false (true in *one way* and false in another). This is not to say that it is lexically, structurally, or illocutionarily ambiguous; but it does possess a kind of pragmatic indeterminacy or equivocality.

As time permits, I shall contrast my work on simple sentences with the treatments given by Jennifer Saul (1997-2007), Joseph Moore (1999, 2000), Stefan Predelli (1999, 2004), Graham Forbes (1997, 1999), Alex Barber (2000), David Pitt (2001), and Alessandro Capone (2015).

Nathan Salmón

University of California, Santa Barbara

Abstract Expressions are synonymous if they have the same semantic content. Complex expressions are synonymously isomorphic in Alonzo Church's sense if one is obtainable from the other by a sequence of alphabetic changes of bound variables or replacements of component expressions by syntactically simple synonyms.1 Synonymous isomorphism provides a very strict criterion for synonymy of sentences. Several eminent philosophers of language—among them, Kit Fine, David Kaplan, Mark Richard, and historically first, Hilary Putnam—hold that even synonymous isomorphism is, in one respect, not strict enough. These philosophers hold that 'Greeks prefer Greeks' and 'Greeks prefer Hellenes' express different propositions even on the pretense that 'Greek' and 'Hellene' are synonyms, so that the two sentences are synonymously isomorphic. Putnam and company hold that the very recurrence (multiple occurrence) of 'Greek' in 'Greeks prefer Greeks' itself contributes something to the proposition expressed—something absent from the proposition expressed by 'Greeks prefer Hellenes' (wherein the semantic content of 'Greek' also recurs), something that indicates the very recurrence in question. Fine wrote a book arguing that this thesis, which he labels semantic relationism, calls for a radically new conception of semantics.2 He introduced a handy terminology (ibid, pp. 54-60, and passim). Using his terminology, according to semantic relationism the proposition expressed by 'Greeks prefer Greeks' is coordinated, whereas the proposition expressed by 'Greeks prefer Hellenes' is uncoordinated (alternatively, negatively coordinated). They have made us an offer we should refuse. I have argued that, pace Putnam et. al., coordination is wholly pragmatic, entirely non-semantic.3 Sentences do not coordinate (positively or negatively) in Fine's sense. Speakers do. Here I supplement the case with a new argument. More precisely, I offer a new application of an older argument strategy. No cognition without recognition—or almost none. With this observation, standard Millianism has sufficient resources to confront Frege's puzzle and

related problems without injecting pragmatic phenomena where they do not belong.

1 Church, "Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief," Philosophical Studies, 5 (1954), pp. 65-73; reprinted in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds, Propositions and Attitudes (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 159-168.

2 Fine, Semantic Relationism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 3 Salmon, "Recurrence," Philosophical Studies, 159 (2012), pp. 407-441. Fine made a petulant response to one aspect of my critique, in "Recurrence: A Rejoinder" Philosophical Studies, 169 (2014), pp. 425-428. I respond to Fine in "Recurrence Again," Philosophical Studies, 172, 2 (2015), pp. 445-457.

Gunter Senft

Max Plank, Nijmegen, NL

Theory meets Practice – H. Paul Grice's Maxims of Quality and Manner and the Trobriand Islanders' language use

As I have already pointed out elsewhere (Senft 2008; 2010; 2014), the Gricean conversational maxims of Quality – "Try to make your contribution one that is true"– and Manner "Be perspicuous", specifically "Avoid obscurity of expression" and "Avoid ambiguity"– are not observed by the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea, neither in forms of their ritualized communication nor in forms and ways of everyday conversation and other ordinary verbal interactions. The speakers of the Austronesian language Kilivila metalinguistically differentiate eight specific non-diatopical registers which I have called "situational-intentional" varieties. One of these varieties is called *"biga sopa"*. This label can be glossed as "joking or lying speech, indirect speech, speech which is not vouched for". The *biga sopa* constitutes the default register of Trobriand discourse and conversation. This

contribution to the workshop on philosophy and pragmatics presents the Trobriand Islanders' indigenous typology of non-diatopical registers, especially elaborating on the concept of *sopa*, describing its features, discussing its functions and illustrating its use within Trobriand society. It will be shown that the Gricean maxims of quality and manner are irrelevant for and thus not observed by the speakers of Kilivila. On the basis of the presented findingsthe Gricean maxims and especially Grice's claim that his theory of conversational implicature is "universal in application" is critically discussed from a general anthropological-linguistic point of view.

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Alberto Voltolini

University of Turin, Italy

How Demonstrative Theatrical Reference Grounds Contextualism

Notoriously, demonstratives raise a problem for traditionalist (or literalist, or minimalist) views on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. For how a demonstrative token contributes to the truth-conditions of the relevant sentential token containing it seems to involve context in its *wide* sense, i.e., as the concrete overall situation of discourse. In order to account for such a situation, so-called traditionalists (or literalists, or minimalists) as to the semantics pragmatic divide typically invoke an enlargement of *narrow*

context, i.e., the set-theoretical construction made of certain parameters, by appealing to a new parameter made of demonstrations or of*demonstrata*. (cf. e.g. Caplan 2003). Yet not only this suggestion seems to be *ad hoc* (Recanati 2004) or to unduly subjectivize semantics (Borg 2004), but there also are counterexamples to it, in that demonstrative *pictorial* reference shows that this enlargement is insufficient (Voltolini 2009). An alternative traditionalist account is provided by Borg (2004, 2012). This account appeals to Mentalese singular object-dependent concepts as the truth-conditional contributions of demonstrative tokens. Yet not only this account admittedly has problems with empty demonstrative tokens, but it also seems to implausibly conflate demonstratives with proper names, as Borgs' treatment of deferred demonstrative shows. In this talk, I want to present another counterexample to the traditional treatment of demonstratives, based on a case involving a demonstrative *theatrical* reference. The case revolves on the different uses of a sentence like "That is fascinating", where the relevant token of "that" may refer either to the actual actor, or to the imaginary individual inhabiting the world of the make-believe game the theatrical *pièce* mobilizes, or even to the fictional character that is generated out of that game (or of another game nested in the previous one) and constitutes the relevant theatrical fictional work.

Douglas Walton

University of Toronto

The Straw Man Fallacy in Easy and Hard Cases

This paper builds a ten-step method for determining whether a straw man fallacy has been committed in a given case or not, by starting with

some relatively easy textbook cases and moving to more realistic and harder cases. The paper shows how the type of argument associated with the fallacy can be proved to be a fallacy in a normative argumentation model, and then moves on to the practical task of building a hands-on method for applying the model to real examples of argumentation. Insights from linguistic pragmatics are used to distinguish the different pragmatic processes involved in reconstructing what is said and what is meant by an utterance, and to differentiate strong and weak commitments. In particular, the process of interpretation is analyzed in terms of an abductive pattern of reasoning, based on co-textual and contextual information, and assessable through the instruments of argumentation theory.

Howard Wettstein
University of California, Riverside

Speaking for Another

In the late 20th century, Direct Reference—an approach associated with Donnellan, Kripke and others, and at odds with the prevailing Fregean approach to the semantics —was beset by the challenges posed by a number of crucial puzzles. These puzzles—concerning the cognitive significance of language—came to dominate the literature. The attempt to resolve them induced a small industry, industrial both in terms of breadth and depth. Counterexamples to the latest proposals were met with new and sometimes ingenious ways to sophisticate the theory, followed by new counterexamples … seemingly without end. At the 1990 Kaplan conference in Israel, a philosopher presented a particularly baroque account, prompting the late

linguist Tanya Rinehart to quip that God would not be that cruel. David Kaplan, noting the futility of the dialectic, remarked that a new idea was needed.

I worked for some years on the puzzles: those concerning attitude reports but also concerning empty names and, surely not least, Frege's original puzzle about identity sentences. In this paper I explain my dissatisfaction with the industry and explore my candidate for the new idea, one based on some remarks of Quine.

Jonathan Wright,
USC, dornsife

The Structure of Assertion and Implicature in Games

In game-theoretical models of pragmatics, common knowledge between a speaker and hearer of their rationality and shared interests provide a structure for the calculation of implicatures (As in Benz (2006), Benz and van Rooij (2007), Franke (2009), Jager (2010)). This proceeds by a process like backward induction to derive what the speaker must believe given that she has cooperatively uttered some sentence rather than another in the strategic situation at hand. I modify such models to dispense with a classical Gricean assumption which they typically make: that what a speaker asserts in sincerely uttering a sentence S should be identified with S's language-determined semantic content. To accommodate the pragmatic determination of what is asserted, first I model semantic contents of sentences as probability distributions over propositions rather than as propositions. After a hearer updates on the information carried by such a distribution, what is asserted is calculated via general pragmatic processes which are also responsible for the calculation of implicatures. Though both asserted and implicated

propositions are pragmatically recovered from a single utterance in a particular strategic situation, they are distinguished by their informational status across a family of similar games. Each are identified as propositions the pragmatic inference of which is resilient to certain changes in the game structure.

Not only do these revisions allow for accounting for pragmatic enrichment in an independently motivated formal pragmatic model, but they pave the way for the implementation of a non-standard approach to semantics. Given a model of all-purpose pragmatic inference, along with intuitions about what is asserted and implicated in certain situations, we work backwards to conclusions about what the semantic contents of sentences uttered in those situations must be. The resulting picture is one on which formal semantics is mediated by formal pragmatics: we discover semantic contents by reverse engineering them from what we actually have intuitions about, the speech acts we perform.

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Douglas Walton

University of Toronto

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This paper builds a ten-step method for determining whether a straw man fallacy has been committed in a given case or not, by starting with some relatively easy textbook cases and moving to more realistic and harder cases. The paper shows how the type of argument associated with the fallacy can be proved to be a fallacy in a normative argumentation model, and then moves on to the practical task of building a hands-on method for applying the model to real examples of argumentation. Insights from linguistic pragmatics are used to distinguish the different pragmatic processes involved in reconstructing what is said and what is meant by an utterance, and to differentiate strong and weak commitments. In particular, the process of interpretation is analyzed in terms of an abductive pattern of reasoning, based on co-textual and contextual information, and assessable through the instruments of argumentation theory.

Dorota Zielinska

Jagellonian University, Krakow

Applications of the field content-form correlation model

In Zielinska (2013), I introduced in a descriptive manner the most basic mechanism of the form-content correlation process in natural language, viewed as a socio-natural phenomenon. I also argued for its plausibility, and showed how to test it both quantitatively and qualitatively. In this

presentation, to show the versatility of the qualitative theory mentioned, I shall discuss the applications of the model to a wide range of penomenon. In particular, I shall present solutions to certain foundational problems related to pragmatic interpretation, which are faced by current formal approaches to language. I shall organize my discussion mainly by considering interpretations on subsequently more complex levels of linguistic organization, but I shall also point out some additional implications of the mechanism advocated, which are not level-specific. For instance, I shall explain how this theory can account for the observation first described by Kuno (1976) that In the passive clause, it is not normally possible for the subject to be NEW, when the internalized complement is OLD.