ENSO IV

Book of Abstracts

**The 4th Conference of
the European Network on Social Ontology**

24–26 September 2015
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Workshop of Critical Social Philosphy
University of Palermo

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Plenary Lectures
Sala Magna

Thursday, September 24ᵗʰ

Introduction

FRANCESCA DI LORENZO
Palermo
9:30

Aiming to present the state of the art in current debate and in theoretical reflection in social ontology, I will identify one of its main focus in the question of the possible preservation of plurality in the social collectivity.

Starting from the many critics of the individualism and anthropocentrism persisting in the classic views of collective intentionality, from Searle's methodological individualism to the many types of persisting reductionism, such as the ones attributed to Bratman and Tuomela, and agreeing with Schmid on the origin of these different forms of residual individualism in the fear of the specter of group mind with its connected risks of collectivism and totalitarianism, I will show that the opposed search of a view of sociality able to escape "the ant trap" (Epstein, 2015) has in any case to avoid the risk of a collectivism that rules out the differences within the social whole. This, it seems to me, is the challenge that the philosophers of collective intentionality, from Schmid to Epstein, from Zahavi to Tuomela, are currently facing.

This opposed search of a view of sociality would have to admit, however, that "plural actions, as we encounter them in social life, should be ascribed to singular agents" (Schmid 2009, p. 26).

I will focus on the path in Schmid's *Plural Action*, where the author, while referring to the necessity of a "solid conception of intentional commonality" allowing more adequate theories of teamwork, also expressly claims that such a conception has to be "compatible with individual intentional autonomy" (ibid., p. 27). Intentional commonality would be able to solve, unlike distributive notions of collective intentionality, both the circularity problem, and the "plural agency problem", that is the problem of an agency which is both plural and one at the same time, without being "just [...] an aggregate of many actions" (p. 26). In the end, however, Schmid, in my view, would come closer to Searle than Schmid himself would seem disposed to make it explicit, where what he indicates as valid in Searle is exactly the basic insight of the individual intentional autonomy. Expressly finding in this point the origin of Searle's methodological individualism, he sums it up in this way: "however plural an action might be, each participating individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action". No doubt that he is agreeing while commenting that "We are in other words not intentional zombies" (ibid.).

My interpretive hypothesis is that we can understand Schmid's path in *Plural Action* as paradigmatic of the individual intentional autonomy challenge, requiring us to overcome the opposition between pure collectivism and individualism, towards a new conception of the relationship between individuals and society, able to safeguard both autonomy and pluralism.

It seems to me that Zahavi's contribution on the sharing of emotional experience, on joint attention and the role in such experience of the difference between you and me, as well as the empirical evidence of cognitive sciences from Tomasello and Rakoczy to Reddy, Moll and Striano supporting it, is particularly significant of the weight of this new autonomy challenge for the anti-individualist and anti-anthropocentric trend of social ontology. Going to the heart of our question, which, in his perspective, is

the question about the difference between self-experience and other-experience, and trying to answer the question whether the we-experience presupposes, precedes, preserves or abolishes that difference, he shows how emotional experience and joint attention presuppose and preserve rather than abolish the difference between self- and other-experience. Showing that coordination and differentiation are required by joint attention and emotional sharing he draws the conclusion that what is in place in both is not some merged unity "but rather a preserved plurality" (Zahavi, 2015). Zahavi's analysis of this rather ephemeral form of we, such as the one emerging from face-to face interaction, and entailing an awareness of the other as a distinct individual, certainly provides us with an important tool for identifying and defining the pre-categorical level of emotional sharing in collective intentionality, which gives us the ground for safeguarding pluralism within collectivity. For this, Zahavi can correctly refer to Searle's fundamental intuition of our Background sense of the other as a potential cooperator as a presupposition of collective intentionality.

The Duty to Know What We're Doing Together

HANS BERNHARD SCHMID
Wien
10:30

If we are morally responsible for an action or omission, we should know that the action or omission in question is ours. The way in which we know in the relevant sense that an action is ours, is what is known under labels such as pre-reflective self-awareness, first-personal self-consciousness, de se knowledge, or non-observational self-knowledge. This paper argues that such self-knowledge comes in a distributive (singular) and a collective (plural) form. Plural self-knowledge is the feature in virtue of which we, together, can be first-person plurally aware of an action as ours, collectively. It is argued in this paper that if we are collectively morally responsible for an action or omission, we should be plurally self-aware of that action or omission as ours, collectively. The paper further examines some of the differences between the individual and the plural form of self-knowledge, and argues that while lack of singular self-knowledge is relatively easy to overcome, the currently prevalent conception of agency and the social structure by which it is supported severely hampers plural self-knowledge. In our societies, it is quite difficult to know what we're doing together. The paper argues that this does not block collective responsibility, and concludes with a consideration on structural consequences of assuming collective responsibility.

Comparative Metaphysics: the Development of Representing Natural and Normative Regularities in Humans and Non-Human Primates

HANNES RAKOCZY
Göttingen
12:00

Much recent research in cognitive development has shown that the core of our adult way of viewing the natural world is already in place early in ontogeny. Even infants conceive of their environment as made up of enduring objects and governed by general regularities that they swiftly infer from limited observations. In this talk, I will first report new comparative evidence showing far-reaching commonalities in these core cognitive capacities in human children and non-human primates. Just like

human infants, non-human primates engage in basic forms of intuitive statistical reasoning and inductive learning of regularities, and they conceive – in psychologically essentialist ways – of the world as made up of enduring objects constituted by their deep properties. In the second part, focusing on deep differences between human children and non-human primates, I will report new developmental work showing that young children's inductive learning crucially goes beyond that of non-human primates in not being confined to carving the world at its statistical joints. Human inductive learning is not only about the extraction of descriptive regularities. Rather, from very early in development, children engage in rational inductive learning of prescriptive rules and norms from limited observations – learning about what one ought to do rather than about what generally happens.

Empathy, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification

DAN ZAHAVI
Copenhagen
17:00

Classical phenomenologists made seminal contributions to the analysis of we-intentionality; contributions that often addressed the relation between empathy, group-identification and we-intentionality. One specific idea found in some of these authors is that group-identification requires an element of self-alienation and that this might come about through a process of reflexive empathy. In my talk, I will develop this idea and discuss to what extent it is supported by current work in social psychology, developmental psychology and psychopathology.

Friday, September 25th

Openness to Engagement

VASUDEVI REDDY
Portsmouth
9:00

In this talk I explore the idea of openness to engagement as a fundamental, if often distorted, aspect of being a (and not only a human) person. I would like to argue three points about its origins and development. One, by birth human infants are already interested in the world and open to actively engaging with it. Two, engagement is a necessarily mutual process. In the absence of mutuality, if the world does not invite or respond to infant actions and expressions, engagement does not happen. Three, engagement breeds engagement. It is only within engagement that differentiation and further complexities can develop. Some clarifications: by the term engagement I don't mean mere interaction, or even only interaction; I refer to something more akin to whole-person emotional involvement. By the term emotion I don't mean merely categorical affects; I use it to refer to emotionality in a broader sense, including vitality contours.
I use evidence from early infancy to put forward a theoretical scheme for the development of knowledge of other minds. I use data from studies of infant engagement with others' attentionality and with others' intentional actions throughout the first year. In contrast to the majority of developmental studies where infants are mere observers of others' attention or intentions, studies which take infants' own involvement with others' attention or intentional actions seriously paint a very different picture of

how infant social cognition emerges. Understanding others begins within second person or I-Thou engagements rather than with conceptual or inferential discoveries. Before infants can understand or relate to persons they observe in the third person, and before they can understand or relate to a group of persons they must actively participate *with* them. This view has implications for current theories of social cognition as well as for theories of collective intentionality.

Saturday, September 26th

From Social Cognition to Engaging Persons: Neuroscience, Phenomenology and History

ANDREAS ROEPSTORFF
Aarhus
9:30

Recently, cognitive psychology and neuroscience has gone social, and the 'social brain' seems now ubiquitous, both in the scientific journals and in the world. However it is not quite clear, what notions of sociality is associated with it. Based on readings of current empirical work, I will attempt to sketch out some of the implicit ontologies underlying this empirical work and to relate them to discussions of social cognition in European thought in the 1930s.

Friday, September 25th
17:00

Book Review Symposium on
The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, 2015,
by Brian Epstein

Précis

BRIAN EPSTEIN
Tufts

There are three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made:
(1) One tradition takes the social world to be built out of individual people similarly to the way traffic is built out of cars. With many people interacting with one another, the *aggregate* has complex properties that none of the individuals has on his or her own.
(2) A second tradition also takes people to be the "building blocks" of the social world, but instead stresses the *thoughts and attitudes* that we have towards one another. A jazz ensemble, for instance, is a prototypical example in this tradition. Members of the ensemble interpret and adapt to one another. And they condition their own thoughts and behaviors on what they expect of others. This tradition sees the social world as built out of our interacting thoughts, attitudes, and expectations.
(3) A third tradition takes a very different approach from the first two. Instead of taking people to be "building blocks," it understands the social world to be a kind of *collective projection* onto the physical world. Money is a typical paradigm in this tradition. Without our projections, a dollar bill would just be a piece of paper. "Money is money," says this tradition, "because we collectively accept that it is money." It understands the social world to be a product of collective belief or acceptance.
Although these traditions have many adherents, they share critical flaws. Each only addresses a narrow part of the social world: they force-fit social facts into limited paradigms. None reflects the latest advances in metaphysics: their claims remain vague or use old tools. And most importantly, they all overestimate the role of *people* in building the social world: the prevailing traditions are overly *anthropocentric.* In **The Ant Trap,** I take a different approach. I start from scratch using a wider set of examples, and bring the resources of contemporary metaphysics to bear. And I show that the anthropocentric bias has led to a distorted understanding of the nature of the social world.
The framework I develop in the book is built on a distinction between the *grounds* and the *anchors* of social facts. Grounding has, in the last few years, received wide attention in metaphysics. Consider, for example, a fact like **Whitey Bulger is a first degree murderer.** That is not a basic fact of nature: instead, it is *grounded* by the fact **Whitey Bulger killed people with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought.** The second fact is not the *cause* of the first. The *causal explanation* for Whitey's being a first degree murderer might be his upbringing, or his greed. In contrast, having killed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought is *what it is* to be a first degree murderer. The grounds of a fact are a *metaphysical explanation* for why that fact is the case.
Anchoring is a new notion I introduce in the book. A key question remains, even after we know what the grounds are for a fact like **Whitey Bulger is a first degree murderer.** What makes it the case that

those are the conditions for being a first degree murderer? What *sets up* those grounding conditions? The anchors are the facts that do this. In the present case, the conditions for being a first degree murderer are anchored, or put in place, by facts about certain votes of the Massachusetts legislature, actions of the Governor, and interpretations of judges. (Anchors are also not causes, but are a *different* kind of metaphysical explanation.)

With grounding and anchoring — along with subsidiary notions we can define using them — I develop a more general and unified framework for understanding the nature of the social world. In terms of the framework, we can see how best to interpret the traditional views, and quickly uncover their limitations. The book's aim is not just to argue for a new model, but also to apply it. In the second part of the book, I focus on *social groups,* one topic within the field of social metaphysics. I address the nature of groups, and explore how diverse facts about groups are grounded. This culminates in a discussion of group *action* and group *intention.* What does it mean when we say "The Supreme Court struck down a law" or "Congress intends to pass tax reform"? How do we understand that groups can have actions and intentions at all, and what are they? Are they merely abbreviations for the actions and intentions of the members? In recent years, many philosophers have developed theories of group action and intention. Using the model, however, I show that these theories have been based on an impoverished picture of the nature of social groups. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, it turns out that group action and group intention depend on *more* than the actions and intentions of group members.

Epstein on Anchors and Grounds

FRANCESCO GUALA
Milano

The distinction between anchors and grounds is one of the most innovative and productive contributions that Epstein makes in The Ant Trap. In this commentary I will argue that the distinction suffers from an ambiguity between tokens and types. This leads to some small confusions in the use of counterfactuals ("Was Gengis Kahn a war criminal?"), but first and foremost it leads Epstein to endorse pluralism about anchors and grounds, a doctrine that, I argue, is not justified in the book and to which there are plausible alternatives.

Saturday, September 26th
11:00

Book review Symposium on

Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, by Raimo Tuomela

Précis

RAIMO TUOMELA
Helsinki

The main title of book is "Social Ontology", with a focus on the two topics of collective intentionality and group agency. These two topics do not cover all that there is to social ontology, which can be broadly understood to cover all kinds of entities and properties that the rational study of the social world is

taken to need ultimately. Understood in this wide sense social ontology is not only a study of the basic nature of social reality but at least in part a study of what the best-explaining social scientific theories need to appeal to in their postulated ontologies. This book largely focuses on conceptually group-based notions. The theory created in this book is based on the full we-perspective (called the "we-mode") and on collective construction of the social world by means of the collective acceptance by the group members.

To say a few words about *collective intentionality* ("aboutness"), a good example of situations involving collective intentionality is given by cooperation. As we know, human beings have the capacity to cooperate in a variety of contexts, including those involving an element of conflict between the participants. Cooperation in its core sense requires collectively intentional attitudes such as joint intentions and shared beliefs, which have the same content and can be taken to be satisfied by the same token state. For instance, watching a flying eagle together, conversing, painting a house together, making an agreement, and forming an organization are examples of phenomena involving collective intentionality. Collectively intentional mental states and actions based on them involve reference to a "we", a social group capable of collective reasoning and action. When the group members jointly intend, believe, have joint emotions, etc. and act on the contents of these mental states, it is from their group's point of view, typically from a "we-perspective", viz. "our" group that intends, believes, has emotions and acts on the contents of these states. (Of course, a group can function only through its members' activities.)

Collective intentionality can be regarded as "the cement of society". This view can be substantiated by reference to three central or "criterial" features of the we-mode framework, viz. *group reason* (a unifying reason for group members to participate in group-based activities), *collectivity condition* for all members ("necessarily being in the same boat"), and *collective commitment* (basically a product of joint intention and the members' group reason involved). These three elements unite the group members and "cement" them together in all contexts where they function as group members, e.g. in the contexts of cooperation and institutional action). They also have a central role in the case of hierarchical groups where the authoritative use of power constrains and sets limits to people's and groups' activities. Chapter 1 discusses these notions and surveys the contents of the book.

The theory of this book assumes that some social groups, including large organized groups, can be viewed as functional *group agents*. This means that we can on functional grounds attribute as-if mental states such as wants, intentions, and beliefs as well as actions and responsibility to these groups. Such group agents are not intrinsically intentional agents ("persons") comparable to human beings, but they can on functional and epistemic grounds be viewed and accepted as extrinsically intentional agents with attributed quasi-mental properties. The group members may engage in group-based reasoning of the kind "When functioning as group members, we want X and take this to require that we jointly do Y and hence do it as a group". This kind of reasoning and acting on it helps to makes them a we-mode group that can act as a group—a functional group agent. The group agent view helps to explain group members' behavior and is often practically useful.

The group agent approach is argued to be especially useful in the case of large and typically hierarchical groups (e.g. corporations and states) in which case theorizing about individuals and their interrelations is impractical. In the specific analyses of various group notions in the book the starting point often is a hierarchical group with "group-internally" or "group-externally" authorized leaders.

Comparing the quasi collectivistic we-mode group view with the individualistic (or "I-mode") idea according to which people act as private persons and as autonomous and primary actors, it can be shown that they are not only conceptually different but that there also are empirically testable functional differences between we-mode and I-mode groups e.g. concerning acting in collective dilemma situations where individual and collective rationality are in conflict. Indeed, the present book provides precise results based on a "team game-theoretic" approach problem. Some experimental

testing concerning the we-mode and I-mode approaches has been performed and the results indicate that there indeed are collective action dilemma situations in which people engage in we-mode reasoning and acting.

Group Agents and Social Institutions: Beyond Tuomela's *Social Ontology*

FRANK HINDRIKS
Groningen

In his recent book *Social Ontology*, Raimo Tuomela provides a rich theory of group agents and institutions. At the heart of Tuomela's conception of group agents lies the idea that a group agent is a collection of individuals who are collectively committed to some belief or goal. Collective commitment provides the basis for Tuomela's conceptual non-reductionism or collectivism, the thesis that collective concepts such as that of a group agent cannot be exhaustively analyzed in terms of individual actions and attitudes. In spite of the fact that he recognizes the causal and explanatory roles of group agents, however, Tuomela combines his conceptual collectivism with ontological reductionism or individualism – the thesis that group agents consist solely of the activities, properties and interactions between individuals. I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with other claims Tuomela makes about collective intentionality. In light of this, it would be best to embrace ontological collectivism. Whereas Tuomela fails to fully appreciate the ontological status of group agents, he overestimates the significance that constitutive rules should have in the analysis of social institutions. Tuomela defends a view of social institutions as norm-governed social practices. He goes on to use the notion of a constitutive rule in order to explain how institutions enable new forms of behavior. I argue that the enabling role of institutions can in fact be explicated in terms of regulative rules. Rather than enabling behavior, constitutive rules serve to make explicit an ontology that regulative rules leave implicit.

An Ambiguity in Tuomela's We-mode.

BJÖRN PETERSSON
Lund

In Raimo Tuomela's influential contributions to our understanding of collective actions and attitudes, the concept of a "we-mode" is central. Judging from his definitions in the 2013 book and in previous work, "we-mode" seems to be a generic label for several types of attitudes or complexes of attitudes sharing the feature that some collective notion, like "group", "member", "participation", or "collective acceptance", somehow figure in their *content* in specific ways. On the other hand Tuomela claims that in "the case of a we-mode intention the important thing is not the specific content of the intention but *the mode of having* the intention". (2013, 67) So, there appears to be a tension between the explicit definitions and some of the informal characterisations of "we-mode" in Tuomela's work.

Tuomela's informal characterisations of the we-mode fit well in with the traditional phenomenological distinction between mode (or quality) and content (or matter) of intentional states, the idea that the same contents can be conceived in different attitudinal modes. Although Tuomela explicitly disavows this latter reading of "we-mode", I believe that understanding "we-mode" along such lines will make the concept better suited for the jobs he assigns to it in his most recent work, especially in relation to game-theoretical applications.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the main features of Michael Bacharach's *team reasoning* and Tuomela's corresponding notion of *pro-group we-mode* reasoning. In section 2 I discuss Tuomela's assumption that Michael Bratman's theory of collective intentionality cannot make room for team reasoning. I am inclined to agree, but I am not sure that such a limitation has to be problematic for Bratman. My diagnosis of why Bratman's theory has this limitation bears on the mode/content discussion. Section 3 develops the critical claim that Tuomela's definitions of "we-mode" do not really provide a we-mode of the kind that team reasoning requires. Section 4 sketches a functional framework in which "we-mode" can be understood in line with the traditional mode/content distinction. In section 5 I claim that the latter notion of we-mode fits better in with the idea of team reasoning, and I discuss some implications in relation to Tuomela's assumption that switching between I-mode and we-mode can be a matter of rational choice.

Institutions and Deontic Powers: Some Comments on the Tuomela-Searle Debate.

GIUSEPPE VICARI
Palermo

In this talk I will analyze Tuomela's theory of institutions and the most recent debate with Searle over the issue of whether institutions conceptually involve the creation and distribution of deontic powers. By way of analyzing Tuomela and Searle's reciprocal criticisms, I conclude that Tuomela does not give us sufficient reasons to give up Searle's thesis that institutions always involve deontic powers, but I also argue that it is necessary to go beyond Searle's recent speech act-centered explanation of human sociality.

More specifically, moving along the lines of Di Lorenzo's view of constitutive rules as built into the logical and pragmatic structure of human activities, and making use of Searle's hypothesis of the Background, I will argue in the final section that the deep roots of deontology can be found in our preintentional and reciprocal taking each other as potentially cooperative agents.

Language, Rules and Normativity
Chair: Marco Carapezza   Sala Magna

What Does Rule Constitutive Rules? The Normative Force of Meta-institutional Concepts.

GIUSEPPE LORINI & MATTEO FERRI
Cagliari

Imagine we have to invent a new competitive game like chess, draughts, soccer, tennis, basketball, Risiko, Monopoli, etc. What should we do? It will certainly be fundamental to define which activity the game should consist in, and then to determine the rules of this new game. But – we should ask ourselves – will we be completely free in this sort of creative activity? Are there any limits to the "inventability" of a new competitive game? As Gaetano Carcaterra pointed out, inventing a new game is not a completely free activity. While he/she is going through with the activity of creating, in fact, the inventor of a new game encounters certain limits. As Carcaterra claims, the inventor of a new game "has to comply with the requirements of game activity in general".

Carcaterra's remark seems obvious, but it actually opens a new study field for the social ontologist and, more specifically, for the researcher on constitutive rules. This remark reveals that, behind constitutive rules, there is "something": there is a background, which, to the constitutive rules' major theorists (Czesła w Znamierowski; John Mabbott, John Searle, Amedeo Giovanni Conte), remained unveiled. It is something which lies behind any system of constitutive rules and, at the same time, exercises a normative power on it. This is what accounts for the title of the present work: what does rule constitutive rules?

Firstly, we will try to remark some of these limits by pointing them out through "grammatical sentences" (in the lexicon of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hubert Schwyzer), "essential laws" (Adolf Reinach) or "essential rules" (Dolores Miller).

Secondly, we will investigate how relevant these limits are for social ontology and philosophy of normativity. Why is the presence of these limits so important for social ontology? They reveal the "normative role" that the concept of "competitive game" has in the creation of new competitive games through constitutive rules. For the inventor of a new competitive game, the concept of competitive game is a limit of his/her power of cultural creation. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of competitive game "rules" a new game's system of constitutive rules.

We are in front of a concept – that one of "competitive game" - which could be defined a "meta-institutional concept". Meta-institutional concepts are concepts that are conditions of possibility of institutions (and therefore of institutional facts). The phrase 'meta-institutional concepts' refers to the fact that meta-institutional concepts go beyond (Greek: *"metá"*) the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility.

It seems that, so far, social ontologists and philosophers of normativity have taken meta-institutional concepts for granted. This fact has limited the power of the tools we can use to study the nature of institutional reality.

Deontic Binding: Imposed, Voluntary, and Autogenic

RUSS MCBRIDE

Utah & Bergen

On some current approaches, deontology is the foundation of the most important aspects of social reality. But we do not yet have an account of *the kinds* of deontic structures in play. One way to approach a taxonomy of deontic kinds is to understand the ways in which they bind to an agent. There are at least three ways of binding deontic powers to any agent. The first two ways emerge from a distinction between those rights and duties forced upon an agent versus those the agent voluntarily accepts. Within the category of voluntarily accepted deontics, however, there is an interesting subtype which, rather than being created external to the agent, is *created, instead, by the agent*. There are, then, three important categories of deontic binding: imposed, voluntary, and self-created (autogenic).

Individuals and Collectivity between Principle of Non-Contradiction, Validity Claims and Joint Commitment

CLAUDIA ROSCIGLIONE

Palermo

This paper outlines a view of the relationship among individuals that is different from the approach that may give rise to assimilation and violence, because it identifies a We-mode embodied in the Individual through the dialectic and dialogic structure that is constitutive of her.
By making reference to Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction built in a linguistic and dialogical form, to the transcendental-pragmatic nature of Habermas' validity claims and to Gilbert's joint commitment, this paper argues for the inherently plural nature of the Individual that implies the involvement of other individuals in the exercise of each individual's rationality, beliefs and actions.
 This paper argues that this theoretical view allows the constitutively pluralist character of subjectivity to emerge. The Individual who thinks, talks, makes her choices, and hence lives, implicitly needs other individuals who form the Collectivity to which she belongs and makes her commitments in the same way she expects the Collectivity to do.
If the principle of determinateness, which is implied by the principle of non-contradiction, the validity claims and the concept of joint commitment, has a constitutive character for everyone, it is possible to argue that the Individual always possesses a We-mode, because anyone is bound to require the Collectivity to exercise the rationality in full and to realize one's own nature.

Managing Violence – a New Basis for Searle's Social Ontology

CRISTINA VOINEA

Bucharest

Searle's project on social ontology is one of the main discussed and debated projects that brings forth the basic structure of society, the elements and concepts that play a crucial role in the formation of social reality. Although this area of research gained much ground within the academic community and became an independent branch of philosophy in its own right, under what the author coined *the philosophy of society* (Searle 1999), there are many critiques and missing links that, at a first sight,

seem to undermine the whole ambitious project of finding the universal structure that holds society. I will start by pointing out the problematic aspects of Searle's concept of collective intentionality, by bringing forth two types of critiques: an internal, as well as an external one. The internal critique states that this concept, as it was built by Searle, does not account for cooperation or collective action, inasmuch as it is indeterminate and vague (Gilbert 2007) (Pacherie 2007). It is not yet clear how it appears, what its internal structure is and how it manifests itself in individual minds. In other words, this concept ignores and leaves aside the problem of intersubjectivity, thought of, by many philosophers, as the most important key of unlocking fundamental knowledge concerning society. The second criticism, the external one, is referring directly to what I call "Searlian institutional reality" that has as a focal point the explanation of the design of the state. After this brief survey of the problems concerning collective intentionality I will argue that in order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive account of the process of creation, development and evolution of social or institutional facts – i.e. of social reality – we should replace collective intentionality with a conceptual framework that gives an account of social and institutional reality by way of investigating how power is deployed and violence contained in different societies. Thus, I will use the conceptual framework built by North, Wallis and Weingast in "Violence and social orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History" (2009) as the basis of my inquiry.

Experience, Cognition and Normativity
Chair: Alessandro Salice   Sala delle Capriate

What is a Game of Blind Chess? Gradualism, Dispositions and the Searle-Smith Debate

MICHAEL BAUWENS
Leuven

Ruben recently criticized Searle's constructivist account of institutional reality for failing to offer an alternative to the classical choices of eliminativism, reductionism, irrealism and emergence. This paper presents another option, namely a gradualist account enabled by pandispositional realism. The problem of different levels or layers of reality and the relations between them can thereby be avoided, while at the same time giving a thoroughly realist account of institutional reality.

Barry Smith has also criticized Searle's basic metaphysical position in a longstanding debate over free-standing Y-terms, advocating the need for a 'realm of the quasi-abstract'. He claims Searle cannot give both a realist account of things like blind chess or debts, while maintaining his naturalist position. On the other hand, his realm of the quasi-abstract faces all the problems Searle wants to avoid with his naturalistic one-world requirement.

The upshot of a gradualist powers-based account of institutional reality is that the picture of different levels of reality is dropped in favor of a continuum. Powers and dispositions are taken as real, always already present and merely awaiting their manifestation. Everything the emergentist might want is thereby already built-in at the basic level. There are no levels of reality hence also no problem of how they are supposed to relate or interact. It is just that certain concatenations of particles, as might be expected, can manifest special, seemingly new dispositions which in turn can be the mutual disposition partner for yet further, iterated manifestations.

The kind of deontic powers that are key to Searle's account of institutions are thereby simply yet another kind of power, one that happens to become manifest when bringing together as mutual disposition partners a certain kind of animal equipped with linguistic capacities and collective intentionality.

Take a game of blind chess. That game depends on both players as disposition partners, it is ontologically subjective as Searle would put it, and epistemically objective. And yet, as Smith stresses, the game is not merely 'in their head', for these are just representations of the game. The question is, what are these representations representations of? What are their truthmakers? The answer is that a game of blind chess is a real dispositional structure or power-net. That dispositional structure is what the players can have representations of. This dispositional structure includes the whole game-tree of that token game of chess.

The borders of that game-tree are set by the rules of chess. Both players have the disposition to adhere to them and to criticize the other one should he or she fail to do so. This holds for a normal game of chess just as much as for a game of blind chess. The only difference between the two is the extent to which this dispositional structure and its evolution through time is made manifest in wooden pieces on a board, but this doesn't affect the ontology of a game of chess itself.

Vigilance towards Promissory Commitment. A Developmental Study.

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Milano-San Raffaele
PATRICIA KANNGIESSER
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
MICHAEL TOMASELLO
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I present empirical findings on pre-school children's vigilance towards promises, in particular their ability to use information about the communicator's past behavior to predict whether a promise will be kept. Promises play important functions in social interactions. By making commitments explicit, they facilitate coordination and promote cooperation. However, the communicator might intentionally or unintentionally break her promise and this is typically costly for the recipient. Therefore, to minimize the risks of trusting a promise which will not be kept, the recipient needs to be vigilant. When and how does vigilance towards promises develop? In contrast to previous developmental research (Astington, 1988; Maas & Abbeduto, 1998; Bernicot & Laval, 1996), recent work showed that three-year-olds already understand the direction of fit of different speech acts (Rakoczy & Tomasello 2009) and the social implications of promises (Kanngiesser, Köymen & Tomasello, submitted for publication). Yet, we know little about children's vigilance towards promises, particularly, in partner-choice situation where it is crucially important to choose a trustworthy partner. There is a growing body of evidence showing that children are equipped with a suite of abilities for epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009) but none of these studies addresses promises. In a series of studies, we investigate the development of children's ability to use information about the communicator's past behavior to predict whether a promise will be kept. In Study 1, three- and four-year-old children were introduced to one puppet who broke promises and another puppet who kept promises. Both puppets then promised to help the child and we recorded which puppet the child chose. Adults perform at ceiling in this task. Results showed that children choose between puppets at chance level, suggesting that they have not yet fully developed the ability to use previous information to predict whether a promise will be kept. To rule out that this failure was due to lengthy procedure, we ran a simplified version (Study 2), but results from the first study were confirmed. However, some children spontaneously referred to normative aspects of promise keeping, which we believe is an important step in the development of a fully-fledged vigilance towards promises. Data collection with five-year-olds is under way to trace the developmental trajectory of children's vigilance and preliminary results suggest a tendency consistent with our expectations.

Relational and Reductive Approaches to Joint Attention

FELIPE LEÓN
Copenhagen

In spite of there being different ways of conceptualizing joint attention, many researchers think of it primarily as a triadic relation, involving (in the simplest case) two subjects and an object that both subjects are attending to (cf. Eilan et al. 2005, Seemann 2011). Furthermore, it is usually accepted that joint attention is characterized by the fact that its occurrence is mutually manifest to the co-attenders. The thought, to put it differently, is that it is 'out in the open' for each co-attender that she is engaged in joint attention with someone else. This broad characterization of joint attention conceals deep disagreements about how to describe this triadic relation. How should each co-attender's psychological states be described? What kind of awareness do they have of each other? And what exactly is the mutual manifestation or openness of joint attention? The aim of my presentation is to briefly present two influential philosophical approaches to joint attention, one defended by John Campbell (2005, 2011) and the other by Christopher Peacocke (2005, 2012), and to recommend a version of a relational view on joint attention inspired by Campbell's position and by work on shared experiences in the phenomenological tradition (Schutz 1967, Zahavi 2015). I argue that Campbell's account has the advantage of not presupposing a lot of cognitive sophistication from each co-attender, and that it can therefore give a more plausible explanation of the role that joint attention may play in coordinated action (Campbell 2011, 419), and of its early emergence in humans' ontogenetic development. At the same time, however, some important aspects of Campbell's account are left quite unexplored by him. In the first place, although he emphasizes the experiential character of the joint attention relation, he says very little about how to understand that character, apart from suggesting that joint attention brings about a "shift" with respect to solitary attention, and that we shouldn't think of joint attention as a sub-personal phenomenon, remote from consciousness (Campbell 2011, 320). Might joint attention also involve a distinctive subjective, qualitative character that makes it different from solitary attention? Secondly, as part of his view, Campbell says that the co-attender enters as a constituent into a subject's experience of joint attention, but it is unclear how this happens. Since the joint attention relation is thought of as primitive by Campbell, there are reasons to suppose that what is at stake is not a process of theorizing or simulating the other's experience, but something more basic than that. It is precisely in connection with these two points that, arguably, phenomenological approaches to shared experiences (Schutz 1967, Walther 1923, Zahavi 2015, León and Zahavi 2015) and social cognition (Zahavi 2005, 2011, Gallagher 2012, León 2013) can prove to be helpful and illuminating.

Normativity and Identification

JOONA TAIPALE
Jyväskylä

Our everyday adult life is governed by various social norms: we are expected to behave, think, and move in particular manners, and whenever we deviate from the socially preferred behavior we tend to feel guilt or shame. What is at stake is not something inborn, however – infants feel no shame or guilt for any of their doings. Therefore, if norms currently govern our life, but have not done so from the start, they must have begun to have their effect on us in the course of time.
One of the most important mechanisms in the appropriation of norms lies in "identification". Children learn to cope in the social world by identifying with other people (caregivers, siblings, nannies, teachers,

and other idols), and by so doing they gradually appropriate various norms shared within a community. This process ultimately culminates in group-identification.

While the central role of *identifications* in various processes of socialization is generally accepted, no consensus exists vis-à-vis the meaning of this concept. What precisely is identification? What happens to the self/other relationship in it? Does identification presuppose a clear-cut distinction between self and other, or does it rather precede or annihilate such dichotomies? Is the concept of identification a unitary one, or are there several overlapping concepts at play?

I will specify the concept of identification from the point of view of normativity and development. My talk will be organized into two sections. I shall first phenomenologically analyze how shared norms are experienced. Here I will argue that insofar as norms have a normative effect on us, they must have this effect *from within* – whenever norms appear to us as something external, they do not appear as *our* norms. This leads to my second, developmentally oriented question: how do norms gain their normative power? In this connection, I will distinguish two general interpretations of identification. In what I will term "dyadic interpretations", the process of identification is portrayed in terms of the subject establishing a relation with an object separate from itself. By contrast, in what I will call "non-dyadic interpretations", identification is described in terms of a relation with an object not differentiated from the self. I will specify these two interpretations via some examples.

Given the central status of the concept of "identification" in debates on social ontology, much depends on how this term is interpreted. When we group-identify, does this imply that we experience ourselves as distinct individuals members of that group (dyadic interpretation) or that we experience ourselves as being one with the group (non-dyadic interpretation)? Approaching these matters from the point of view of normativity, I will show how both interpretations seem to be operative (and occasionally conflated) in the current debates, and argue that they ought to be more carefully distinguished.

Collective Experiences and Social Conflicts
Chair: Francesca Piazza   S. Antonio Abate

We-Experiences and Common Knowledge

OLLE BLOMBERG
Copenhagen

In a recent paper, Zahavi gives a characterisation of "we-experiences" informed by Schutz's discussion of the "pure We-relationship". Zahavi presents some core features of such experiences, one of which is "reciprocal awareness". To take part in a we-experience, such as enjoying a movie together or sharing the excitement of encountering a hedgehog, "[y]ou need to experience the others' perspectives on you, you need to be aware of them as being aware of you and to see yourself through their eyes, so that you can come to experience yourself in the same manner as you experience them." (Zahavi 2015, 94, see also Schutz 1967, 156)

In this talk, I argue that to adequately capture the reciprocal awareness characteristic of we-experiences, we need to go beyond the third-order intentionality invoked by Zahavi and Schutz. The phenomenology of we-experiences is arguably such that it must rule out any higher-order false beliefs regarding the object of the we-experience (e.g. my belief that you believe that I believe that you believe that the hedgehog is a pin cushin). There is no principled reason why such false beliefs cannot be of an order higher than three. I argue that this is best explained by appeal to what is typically referred to as 'common knowledge' (Lewis 1969). The infinite hierarchy of higher-order attitudes associated with this notion must somehow be implicit in we-experiences.

I consider and reject a potential response to this suggestion, namely that such higher-order beliefs are ruled out because at all *thinking* about another is incompatible with partaking in a we-experience (see e.g. Schutz 1967, 140-141). But could cognitively limited beings such as ourselves arrive at this infinite hierarchy of implicit beliefs? By taking common knowledge to a basic relational state (following Lewis 1969), I argue that the implicit presence of the hierarchy can be construed in a psychologically realistic way.

Finally, consider how the discussion about common knowledge is related to phenomenological concerns. I argue that common knowledge as a basic relation state obviates the need for something like" plural pre-reflective self-awareness" (see Schmid 2014), with the advantage that it can explain the tight connection between what we see, think, enjoy etc, and what I and you see, think, enjoy etc. I also suggest that what Schutz had in mind when writing about the "pure We-relationship" may have been something like common knowledge. Indeed, Schutz takes the pure We-relationship to be associated precisely with the possibility of rational coordination in situations where common knowledge seems to be needed (Schutz 1953, 25).

Between Me and You. A Phenomenological Account of Social Conflict.

ALICE PUGLIESE
Palermo

Political theories, intercultural sociology but also subaltern-, disability-, and inter-gender-studies have intensively dealt with the problematic issues raised by the social interaction of differing social groups.

Phenomenology hides a great potential in exploring such phenomena. The Husserlian theory of subjectivity shows that such crises are first of all collapses of a shared way of experiencing the world: they are basically perceptive conflicts. Phenomenology attempts to identify the common root of such a conflicting diversity, claiming that variability of experiential constitution is not merely empirical as well as it is not completely arbitrary and random. Perceptive conflicts have rules, even if they do not respect those of predicative logic. This hidden, profound law can be traced back to the motivational structure of consciousness as necessary basis of each intersubjective encounter.

As a basic process that animates and makes experience possible, the constitution of the world is a motivated process. This means that the process shows regularities, is sense-related, holds a direction and is strongly influenced by past experience, without however being caused.

Motivation is the non-causal reciprocal effect, binding together living experiences, actions, behaviors. On the one hand, it is related to our individual history and attitudes and can be considered as an expression of the individual character of life. On the other hand, motivation follows deep regularities, based on the shared structure of inner temporality, on association, on pulsional tendencies, needs, desires.

The well-established and reciprocal connection between experience, constitution and motivation, at the basis of the phenomenological theory of perception, provides a non-causal, non-naturalistic, and even non-evaluating, non-normative access to the problem of conflict.

Intersubjective conflicts appear rooted in experiential conflicts, in different ways of seeing the world. At a deeper level, this means that both in the relationship with others and with ourselves we face ultimately motivational conflicts.

This last argument leads me to the following 3 questions:

1. Like the motivations that found them, and since they ground on motivations, do conflicts follow rules? Are they not absurd, is it possible to make sense of them, is their motivational logic even shared or can be shared, since it is rooted in the universal structure of consciousness?

2. Since they are motivational, conflicts are not bound by strict causal relations. This means that they can shift, adjust, find new ways of satisfaction. Therefore, might motivation, unlike causality, provide an available basis for negotiation?

3. Could intersubjective conflicts as experiential conflicts be similar or at least not completely different from conflicts that we can experience on our own, before even meeting another person? What can we learn from the inner dynamics of consciousness that could help to make sense of social conflicts?

In my contribution I would like to address these three questions by means of a phenomenologically oriented description of subjective life.

Imagining Collectives and Collective Imagination

THOMAS SZANTO & ALBA MONTES SÁNCHEZ
Copenhagen

Social aspects of imagination have been explored in a number of disciplines. Within the ongoing debate on social cognition and empathy, work has focused on imagining other's mental states, often investigated in tandem with pretense (Leslie 1987, 1994; Currie 1995; Nichols & Stich 2003; Rakoczy 2008). Sociologists, social and political philosophers have explored 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983), and forms of social imaginary (Castoriadis 1975; Bourdieu 1979; Illouz 2007).

Yet, somewhat surprisingly, and especially given the currently thriving debate on collective intentionality (Schmid & Schweikard 2014) or collective memory (Sutton 2009), there is a rather significant lacuna when it comes to imagination pertaining to collectives. In this paper, we address this topic head-on; in particular, we discuss two sets of interrelated issues:

(1) First, we concentrate on *the issue of imagining collectives*, or the question of whether there is something distinctive about individuals or groups of individuals imaginatively targeting collective entities. Is there something special about imagining not simply fairy-tale figures or 'better worlds', but precisely imagining or imaginatively describing social groups? Our conjecture is that there is a deep connection between imagining collectives and social identification, and the social psychology of in-group/out-group distinctions. Here, not necessarily, though often, and in contrast to individual imagination, desires and wishes (e.g., wishing to belong to a group) will be essential to imagining collectives. To illustrate this claim, we elaborate on a specific case from the context of genomic-historical research that has also been studied by social psychologists (Scully et al. 2013). The application of genomics to the study of our past has a significant impact on previous identity-constituting narratives or expectations shaped by culture or by family or personal history. Finding out about ancestral genetic links often implies re-imagining certain collectives and re-shaping the respective identity narrative(s) (Scully et al. 2013; Nelson 2008). As we show, the need for such re-imagining and adjusting processes points towards the importance of imagination to maintain (or, less frequently, drop) social identification, and suggests that the desire to belong plays a crucial role here.

(2) The second issue we tackle is whether collectives can be attributed proper imaginary representations, or their own mental imaginary, or even be said to have an own faculty of imagination. In other words, can groups collectively imagine, or perform, as a group, acts of imagination? Call this *the issue of collective imagination*. The question we specifically address here is whether it is the content, the subject or the mode that individuates collective imagination. We provide a multi-dimensional analysis of the phenomenon. Furthermore, and based on the results of our discussion of the social-identification mechanisms of imagining collectives, we suggest that—in contrast to individual imagination, where we do not necessarily wish or desire the imagined properties or states of affairs to obtain—in collective imagination, we indeed, if not necessarily at least typically, do so.

What Constitutes Being a Fan? Towards a Social Ontology of Sport Fandom

GERHARD THONHAUSER
Wien

The aim of my talk is to present preliminary remarks towards a social ontology of sport fandom. The leading question is: What makes an individual a fan? I will focus on fans of sport teams, leaving aside questions about the demarcation between sport fans and other forms of fandom, the difference between being fan of a team and fan of an individual, and distinctions from related forms of collective activity like hooliganism.

To begin with, I will present a preliminary definition of fandom. The main idea is that fandom, firstly, is constituted by an affective involvement, a concern (for a team); a fan cannot be indifferent about his or her team. Secondly, this concern has a communal dimension; being a fan implies being part of a fan community: the community of fans has a constitutive role for one's identity as a fan and the identification with a team.

After responding to immediate challenges to this definition, I will develop the notion of fandom further by examining the role of affectivity in group-affiliation. The relation between affectivity and group-membership is twofold: On the one hand, shared concern is a decisive factor in the formation of fan communities. On the other hand, being member of a community of fans gives rise to emotions that one would not be able to experience otherwise. This combines a sociological and a philosophical thesis: The philosophical claim is that certain emotional experiences are only possible as (part of) collective experiences. The sociological assumption is that sport is one of (few) spheres in modern Western society in which such collective experiences are (still) possible.

Finally, I want to argue that levels of group-affiliation are distinguished by the degree of shared concern and the collectivity of affective experiences. An account of group-affiliation based on affectivity must be broad enough to include all forms of fandom, from very weakly integrated to the most dedicated fans. The concern for a team and the corresponding belonging to a community can diverge vastly in degree. This would be the point at which the question of inclusion/exclusion can be addressed (having in mind that fan groups are known for being exclusionary of certain individuals based on gender, ethnicity, class, disability, etc.). Given the proposed definition of fandom, it appears that weak forms of fandom are based on communities which are, in fact, very open. Stronger forms of fandom, however, appear to imply more integrated communities with more regulated membership.

Collective Action and Collective Responsibility
Chair: Kaarlo Miller   Sala Magna

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A HOLLYWOOD STANDOFF

SARA R. CHANT
Tulane

Recent inquiries into collective moral responsibility worry that if moral responsibility attaches to the collective as such and not simply to the individuals who compose it, then collectives must be distinct moral agents with 'minds of their own.' But this poses a dilemma: either accept the curious existence of collective agents and group minds or reject the possibility of genuinely collective moral responsibility. In 'Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff,' I offer a counterexample to the so-called 'collective agency thesis.' In this paper, I argue that freedom of a specified sort, rather than joint agency, is required for collective moral responsibility. The payoff for adopting this approach to collective responsibility is the possibility of a unified theory across random collections to incorporated agents.

Corporate Psychopathy without Corporate Psychopaths.

FRANK HINDRIKS
Groningen

Corporations and psychopathy have been connected in two ways. First, corporations themselves might be psychopaths (Bakan 2004). Second, a substantial number of people employed by corporations have psychopathic characteristics (Babiak and Hare 2006). A natural thought is that corporations might display psychopathic behavior because they employ a substantial number of psychopaths. At the same time, however, it seems plausible that structural and external factors also contribute to the explanation of corporate disasters and other forms of harmful corporate behavior. I argue that it is in fact possible for a corporation to be a psychopath even though none of its members is a psychopath. The single-minded focus of corporations on profit maximization can make it difficult for them to take the interests of other agents into account in ways that morality requires. Some of them end up 'seeking self-interest with guile'. This can be triggered or reinforced by the popular conception of the market as an amoral domain. Finally, fierce competition can also crowd out motives other than self-interest. This inquiry is useful both for theoretical and practical purposes. Insofar as corporate moral agency is concerned, it serves to replace an all-or-nothing approach with a more nuanced picture on which only some organizations have moral agency. It also suggests that for some corporations corporate social responsibility cannot be more than a marketing tool. Finally, if psychopathic corporations are to escape corporate death, I argue, the legal framework should be such that they are strapped like a straightjacket.

Groups: Fictitious Agents with Real Rights and Responsibilities?

ARTO LAITINEN
Helsinki

Raimo Tuomela's *Social Ontology* argues that groups are real causal action-systems, but their agentic features are fictitious. Such a view may have difficulties with accommodating the view that groups nonetheless are for example real, non-fictitious owners of property. With rights (including property rights) presumably come responsibilities. This paper asks whether one can hold these views together: that groups are *merely fictitious agents with real rights* (including property rights) *and responsibilities*.

I will first exclude two ways out of the dilemma: first, one cannot easily escape this problem by suggesting that groups do not literally have rights or responsibilities. For example ownership and property rights apply to the collectives and organizations directly and literally.

Second, perhaps groups and individuals are on a par as centers of rights and responsibilities but perhaps *all* rights and responsibilities are equally fictitious. I will assume it is better if we can avoid that conclusion, and defend the non-fictitiousness of rights and responsibilities.

The way that the paper tries to defend the combination that fictitious agents such as groups and corporations really and literally have rights (and rights in turn entail some responsibilities for their bearer), is the following.

Not all deontic powers or normative statuses are had by agents. Arguably pawns in a game are regarded as having normative statuses and powers. When playing a game, we regard different pawns to have different powers within the game. That the pawns do not play the game does not reduce their capacity to carry or possess game-internal powers.

We can then assume that the social practice of owning property is like a game in that respect – there are centers with normative entitlements, namely property rights. Such normative centers are also able to make normative commitments (e.g. make contracts to sell and buy).

We can then suggest that such centers of normative entitlements and commitments come in two forms: some entitlements and commitments are had by real agents (individual persons) and some are had by fictitious agents that are "mere" centers of commitments (groups), that are acted for by others (members or proxies). The former are self-moving, the latter are more like vehicles that need a driver. Groups on this view are like pawns in a game, regarded by others (who play the game) as having normative statuses (within the game). Because rights come with responsibilities, whoever is normatively authorized to act in the name of the corporation is thereby laden with the task to carry out the responsibilities that the (constructed but real) 'normative center' has in its normative score.

The paper tries to articulate such a view, and argues that it enables us to see groups as fictitious agents with real rights and responsibilities.

Non-Agent Collectives, Forward-Looking Collective Responsibilities, and Climate Change

BILL WRINGE
Bilkent

Many accounts of collective responsibility and collective obligation start by investigating the conditions under which a group of agents constitutes a collective agent, and then considering the conditions under which such agents have obligations to act in certain ways. (French 1984, Gilbert 1989, Rovane 1998 , List and Pettit 2011, Isaacs 2011) Agency-centred conceptions of collective responsibility have uncovered a wide range of kinds of collectives which we might see as bearing responsibility for past wrongdoing,

including business corporations (French 1984), nations (Gilbert 2008, Stilz 2011), goal directed collectivities, (Isaacs 2011) informal associations, (Gilbert 1989) and the like. Collectives like these are likely to be among the bearers of forward-looking obligations, including obligations to take actions which will mitigate climate change.(French and Wettstein, eds 2014)

In this paper, I discuss whether forward-looking collective responsibilities, including responsibilities for mitigating harms due to climate change, can fall on collectives which are not agents. Agency-centred conceptions of collective responsibility have uncovered a wide range of kinds of collectives which we might see as bearing responsibility for past wrongdoing. More recently a number of authors have suggested the possibility of locating forward-looking collective responsibilities in the hands of collectives which do not meet the conditions for collective agency. These include mutually-dependent groups with common interests, so called 'should be' collectives, coalitions of the willing, and the so-called 'global collective'. These are merely potential collective agents: groups which could become organised in such a way as to be collective agents, but are not currently so organised.

I address two significant challenges to the idea that non-agent collectives can be the bearers of forward-looking responsibility: the 'Capacity Challenge' and the 'Reactive Attitudes Challenge'. The first suggests that non-agent collectives cannot be the bearers of collective obligations because the scope of collective obligations is limited by the 'ought implies can' principle and the kinds of capacities which are relevant to meeting these obligations are the kinds of capacities which only agents can have. Groups can only have collective obligations if they are capable of self-directed reactive attitudes, and non-agent collectives are not so capable. Although attributions of collective obligation are constrained by considerations about collective capacities and reactive attitudes, neither challenge rules out the possibility of non-agent collectives being obligation bearers.

Social Groups: Ontology, Identity and Membership
Chair: Italo Testa   Sala delle Capriate

Perceiving Social Groups: A Kantian Account

TERRY GODLOVE
Hofstra

I sketch a Kantian answer to a fundamental question in the metaphysics and epistemology of social groups: Are such things as corporations, colleges, and soccer teams cognizable? That is, in what sense are social groups objects of possible experience? While Kant says little about social ontology, I extend his account of ordinary empirical cognition to the cognition of social groups. I argue that groups do exist—that is, that they are objects of possible experience—and that we perceive them as we do other existing objects. I rely on Katherine Richie's suggestion that social groups are realizations of structures, though the Kantian view I develop departs importantly from her account. Social groups are comprised of existing persons standing in mathematical and dynamical relationships to one another. The interest here lies in how Kant's transcendental idealism governs the details of that structure. The central claim is that we do sometimes cognize a plurality of individuals as acting and reacting as one. Thus, if I am unacquainted with football I will likely take in the scene in just this way, as eleven people moving around independently on the field—a striker, a goal-keeper, etc. On the other hand, a knowledgeable spectator observing a high level of play and inferring a rich social structure may well intend see a single dynamical whole made possible only through the prior cognition of its parts. But the dynamical element is only half of the story. In seeing the team as a single dynamical whole I must include an element of mathematical cognition, vis., the apprehension of a bounded shape whose parts are possible only in the

whole. From a Kantian point of view, both dynamical and mathematical synthesis must be implicated. Without the dynamical element I see only nodes and lines—a merely mathematical structure. Absent the mathematical element I see persons who can never be members of any social group, moving in isolation.

Group Belief in Structured Coalitions

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Group belief is a key concept in the areas of collective intentionality and group reasoning. We develop a modal logic for group belief and prove soundness and completeness with respect to a possible worlds semantics. The formalism aims to capture the idea that a constituted group forms part of a structured coalition of agents, and we endow groups with a topological structure. This structure may reflect different kinds of relations between group members that are relevant for the group commitments or activities. Given suitable possible worlds structures, we say that a proposition p is a group belief of a group G of agents if p is a common belief of the set of agents forming the colimit of G in the associated topology. We discuss properties of this approach and show that it satisfies some of the main adequacy conditions that have been proposed for group belief in the literature.

How to Identify with a Group

ALESSANDRO SALICE
Copenhagen

What does it mean to conceive of oneself as being a member of a group; in other words, what does it mean to "group-identify"? In the first part of the presentation, the suggestion is put forward that the notion of group identification encompasses at least three different elements which generally are intermeshed: in order to full-blown group-identify, the individual has to (i) adopt a peculiar perspective, i.e., a *we*-perspective, (ii) feel attached to the group and (iii) activate specific social expertise (so-called 'group nous').

In the second part of the talk, particular attention will be paid to the idea that, when an individual group-identifies, she seems to already presuppose that there is a group to begin with – a group with which she *then* identifies. This can be made clear especially in the light of the following consideration: if group-identification partly consists in taking the perspective of a group, then the group-identifier appears to take it for granted that there is a group, whose perspective she is adopting. Said another way, group-identification doesn't simply require the adoption of a we-perspective, it rather requires a *switch* of perspectives: from a purely spectatorial one to an inner, participatory perspective.

If these considerations are on the right track, then it seems that two consequences can be drawn from them. The *first* is that there are at least two senses in which one can talk of group membership and, consequently, of groups. Group membership in the first sense is characterized by the individuals identifying with the group and it gives raise to what might be called a "we-group" (a group with a perspective or a point of view). The second form of group membership is instantiated in, e.g., classes defined by social categories, that do not have a perspective and the members of which are not required to group-identify. But how these two forms of group membership are related to each other?

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This question leads to the *second* consequence that can be derived from previous considerations. The idea is that group identification could be aligned with those mental representations that have a so-called 'Presup [Presupposition] Direction of Fit.' Just like remorse can be modeled as deep regret or guilt for something, which is presupposed to be a wrong committed to the effect that, accordingly, I can feel remorse only if I have assumed that I have done something wrong; so I can identify with a group only if I am already presupposing that I am member of that group.

Concluding, I address the two possibilities that this view opens: the first possibility is that the presupposition that grounds group identification is correct, in which case a we-group emerges. By contrast, the second possibility addresses cases where the presupposition misfires and the individual is acting *qua* member of a we-group, although either there is no such group or the individual is simply not a member of that group.

Badfellas: An Experiment on the Social Dilemma of Group Reputation

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Like individuals, groups possess and create reputations that others use when deciding how to treat that group and its members. The fundamental problem in building a 'good' group reputation, and preventing it from being destroyed, has wide-reaching effects in conflict, cooperation, and exchange situations. Here, we focus on the 'dark' side of group reputation, i.e. group reputation for violence. When the reputation is at the group level, do group members like gang members or mafia affiliates realise its value? Do non-members consider it when they face group members? Do group members treat their reputation as a group as a public good, ripe for exploitation? And, can typical methods used to overcome social dilemmas allow a group reputation to be generated and sustained? We address these questions using a novel experiment that combines a strategic game and an ethical method for creating a reputation for harm.

Shared Values and Moral Responsibilities
Chair: Salvatore Tedesco   S. Antonio Abate

Social Unity, Groups and Shared Values: Some Phenomenological Insights

FRANCESCA DE VECCHI
Milano-San Raffaele

The issue I address concerns the fact that the contemporary social ontological debate does not pay sufficient attention to values. Indeed, social ontology today does not include theories of values focusing adequately on their specific "material nature" of values. In other words, contemporary social ontology lacks *axiology*. This implies that the specific role values play for social unity is not taken into account.
In my talk, I focus specifically on the role played by values for the existence of groups or collectives: i.e. for their creation, maintenance in existence and quality of their existence.

As a paradigmatic case of the "state of the art" of values in contemporary social ontology, I introduce Margaret Gilbert's account of shared values (Gilbert 2005, 2009, 2014). In this account values are considered neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity.

I suggest that phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow us to account adequately for values and to understand values' crucial role for social unity. More precisely, I discuss three phenomenological theses on values:

(i) *The shareable vs. divisible values thesis*: the more divisible values are, the less shareable they are. And conversely: the less divisible values are, the more shareable they are. There are values which essentially divide and not unify the individuals who feel them–e.g. values of the "sensibly agreeable", such as the sweetness of a food or the warmth of a blanket–, and, on the contrary, there are values which essentially are shareable without limit and without any division and diminution, and unify the people who feel and enjoy them–e.g. "person values" such as the beauty of a work of art, the friendship between two individuals (Scheler 1913-1923, § 3).

(ii) *The collective values thesis*: there are values which are essentially collective (vs. individual values): they need to be enjoyed by some individuals together and cannot be enjoyed by only one individual (e.g. the justness of a law, the solidarity of a behaviour).

(iii) *The enjoying values to the full thesis*: there is an *essential tendency* of human beings to enjoy values to the full. Such tendency leads human beings to *exchange* and *share* values; by so doing, human beings *create social relations and social unity* and enhance the *quality* of their *existence* (Schapp 1930).

From Social Acts to Communities. An Itinerary through Realist Phenomenology.

STEFANO ROSSI
Milano-Cattolica

In my paper I would like to address a quite underestimated contribution to the study of social realities and social acts in the phenomenological context, namely the inquiries of such authors as Edith Stein, David von Hildebrand, Gerda Walther and Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg. My contribution intends to give a sketch of a past debate of both historical and theoretical meaning for the current studies in social ontology. Typical of this debate is the effort to bring together a phenomenological analysis of social acts and a more ontological enquiry about the nature of a community. The difference between society (Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft) will be assumed as a starting point so to restrict our considerations only to the latter, especially in the form of a community of more than two persons, leaving relatively aside such social acts as e.g. love, insofar they preside over the formation of particular communities as marriage. The core of the concept of community lies in the effort to grasp the reality of such interactions that go beyond a coordinated agency between members of a group in order to achieve a certain goal. Following the attempts of realist phenomenologists to account for the community's nature, we shall analyze a description of a community's being which has to justify its resemblance to a personal being, without ascribing a substantial being to the community. In this regard we shall consider whether and in which sense a community has a conscience, a personality, a soul, or a spirit on its own. Moreover we shall consider questions such as the status of an individual experience when the individual is addressed as a member of a community, thus the problem of Gemeinschaftserlebnisse, focusing on the structure and the subject of such experiences, along with the more general problem of the constitution of a community's experience from singular individual experiences.

Second-Person Interaction and Moral Responsibility

J. VAN GRUNSVEN
Fordham

My paper explores how broadly enactive contributions to social cognition affect questions about individual moral responsibility. I begin by discussing Vasudevy Reddy's approach to social cognition. Reddy (2008) argues that we acquire an understanding of ourselves and others as minded intentional agents through second-person interactions. The logic of these interactions is hermeneutic: we acquire an understanding of minds through interacting with them, and "The more you engage with other minds, the more there must be to engage with" (2008, 31-2). This thought seems to be at once epistemological and ethical. We acquire a proper understanding of each other as minded beings through recognizing each other as affording mutual engagement.

In a recent proposal, enactivists Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance (2009) have suggested that a second-person framework along the lines of Reddy's requires a radical re-thinking of our understanding of individual moral responsibility. Colombetti and Torrance argue that it is an important upshot of an enactive/interactive approach to social cognition that we should pay more attention to the inter-personal relational domains within which actions unfold. I argue that while Colombetti and Torrance are getting at something important, they are too quick to toss the notion of individual moral responsibility to the side. In fact, I show that a second-person enactive approach to moral action and interaction is *by its own lights* committed to the idea that to perceive others as persons who afford to be interacted with is to perceive them as responsible intentional agents. To develop my argument I rely in part on Reddy who, in passing, suggests that we acquire an understanding of what it means to be responsible or accountable to others through second-person interaction: "direct engagement … calls out from you a different way of being, an immediate responsiveness … and an *obligation* to 'answer' the person's acts" (Cf. Reddy, 2008, 27, my italics). To bring out the implications of Reddy's tentative suggestion I turn to P.F. Strawson's seminal essay "Freedom and Resentment."

Like Reddy, Strawson holds that our answerability to others, as well as our tendency to view others as answerable to us, is intimately tied to our ability to view them from a second-person standpoint. As participants in interaction we occupy a standpoint from which we see and respond to each-other as 'yous' and Strawson argues that it is precisely part and parcel of our seeing each other as 'yous' that we take each other as responsible agents.

It is when we switch from a second-person standpoint of mutual answerability to a third-person observational perspective that we often place someone outside the community of moral responsible agents.

I show that while Colombetti and Torrance's proposal grows out of a second-person approach, it curiously privileges a third-person perspective on what it means to be responsible.

The Labelling of Mental Disorders

TUOMAS VESTERINEN
Helsinki

In this paper, I study how mental disorders are labelled and analyze the looping effects that are involved in their classification. Labelling and classification influence mental disorders and the way they manifest through looping effects (cf. Ian Hacking). I argue that looping effects differ according to their scope, effects and how the labelled individuals are involved. As a case study, I analyze the debate over whether

the Southeast Asian syndrome *latah* is a human or natural kind. *Latah's* key features are similar to Tourette's syndrome but it can be found only among certain culturally determined groups in the Malaysian and Indonesian societies. I argue that because of the strong biological cause involved in Tourette's syndrome, labelling and classification affect mainly its symptoms. In contrast, due to the strong social element involved in *latah*, the looping effect influences directly the disorder and creates more refined symptoms. This way I try to show that although there may be (physiological) dysfunctions underlying mental disorders, one irreducible reason we use the label mental disorder is to stigmatize social deviance. We label behaviour as abnormal because it violates our norms on how people should behave. This in turn, through the looping effect, influences and enables mental disorders in different degrees. The upshot of my analysis is that psychiatric research should replace folk descriptions with causal explanations and find out whether there are any physiological causes behind our folk labels. In addition, classification systems like the Diagnosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and International Classification of Disorders (ICD) influence mental disorders through looping effects in different degrees. Consequently, they should not be seen as providing clear-cut definitions of mental disorders.

Friday, September 25th
14:30

The Nature of Collective Intentionality
Chair: Mattia Gallotti   Sala Magna

Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Agency

MATTI HEINONEN
Helsinki

During recent years, philosophers such as Stephen Butterfill (2012), Elisabeth Pacherie (2013) and Deborah Tollefsen (2005) have argued that received philosophical accounts of shared agency cannot be used to provide an adequate account of the shared activities of young human infants, because infants do not have the cognitive resources that are needed for framing shared intentions. In particular, infants do not have the meta-representational capacities that are needed for formulating beliefs and intentions about the intentional states of other agents. Accordingly, these philosophers have set out in search of minimalist accounts of shared agency, which impose more modest cognitive demands on jointly acting agents than standard philosophical accounts. The minimalists have often contrasted their views with maximalist accounts of shared agency, which presuppose that the agents have advanced mindreading skills (Bratman 2014), and which in some instances also involve reference to group agents (Gilbert 2013; Tuomela 2013) or irreducible intentional state types (Searle 1990). The minimalists have frequently also suggested that their accounts could play a constitutive role in giving rise to some of the forms of joint action that the maximalists have investigated.

In my presentation, I distinguish two versions of the challenge that minimalist accounts of shared agency have posed against received philosophical accounts of shared agency, and relate them to Bechtel and Richardson's (2010) account of functional decomposition and localization as a research strategy in the biological and psychological sciences. According to the *complementarity version of the minimalist approach*, the minimalists have analyzed a different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. According to the *constitution version of the minimalist approach*, the minimalists have exposed the mechanisms that

make performing joint actions possible, whereas established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action focus on the stages of deliberation and decision-making preceding joint action. I will argue that these two versions of the minimalist program are built on different methodological presuppositions, and should accordingly be regarded as separate projects, rather than two sides of one and the same undertaking.

Questioning Individual Intentional Autonomy in Collective Intentionality

JUDITH MARTENS
Bochum
B. LEIJSSENAAR
Radboud

Most accounts of collective intentionality adhere to the individual ownership claim: that only individuals can have intentions and perform actions. All interpretations of the individual ownership claim adhere to some form of individual intentional autonomy: that individuals are responsible for their behaviour as agents and that their behaviour can be ascribed to them as actions for which they can claim ownership.

However, despite the apparent importance that the current literature assigns to individual intentional autonomy, the meaning of the concept 'autonomy' remains unclear. Additionally, individual intentional autonomy and individual motivational autarky are often mixed up, adding to the confusion about individual ownership and autonomy. We explore possible interpretations of the individual autonomy claim to see whether they are viable.

Through data found in developmental psychology, social psychology, and social and political philosophy we hope to show that individual intentional autonomy is hampered on many different levels. A revaluation of the claims at the basis of most accounts of collective intentionality, in particular the individual ownership claim and the role of individual intentional autonomy, is needed.

Our considerations point at the fact that although intentionality, qua mental state, might indeed be owned by the individual, individuals do not 'own'—are not autonomous—in regard to the contents of their intentions. Does this mean that such intentions are no longer—or not solely— 'ours'? Are intentions caused by 'influence' no longer the result of individual autonomy and can we still consider them intentions? In order to better understand the relation between individual and collective intentions, the social determination of intentions and the situatedness of individual autonomy should be taken into consideration.

Institutional Mimesis as a Historical Determinant of Collective Acceptance

CORRADO ROVERSI
Bologna

Theories of collective intentionality are currently the mainstream conception in social ontology. They assert that the nature and content of social and institutional facts can be reduced to a special kind of collective mental content, a network of intertwining individual mental states in the form of beliefs, commitments, and intentions. Even though authors diverge significantly on how to describe this network, there is a presupposition shared both by supporters and critics of collective intentionality. This is the idea that social reality must be explained mainly on a synchronic level, namely, as the outcome of an analysis that does not take time as a crucial variable. By drawing on Randall Dipert's concept of "deliberative history" and Ian Hacking's "historical ontology", in the first part of this paper I will try to

show that this presupposition is neither necessary nor fruitful for contemporary social ontology. Indeed, the psychologistic framework of collective acceptance theories could gain much more explicative power if cast in the framework of a dynamic, diachronic dimension, improving considerably its capacity to explain not only the structure, but also the very genesis and evolution of the mental states backing social reality in a given context.

I will therefore conjecture that contemporary social ontology needs a theory of the possible historical determinants of collective intentionality. Then, in the second part of the paper, I will introduce what I take to be one of such determinants: the phenomenon of institutional mimesis. Institutional mimesis is a relation of imitation holding between the constitutive rules of a given social institution, which are the content of collective mental states, and a conceptual structure existing before the construction of that institution, a structure which was already collectively accepted and thus originally provided the rationale for that institution being framed in that way and not another. I will then introduce a distinction between two different cases of institutional mimesis—mono-categorial and trans-categorial. In the case of mono-categorial mimesis, the normative structure of a social institution reproduces and is grounded on the normative structure of another, pre-existing one. In the case of trans-categorial mimesis, instead, the institution's constitutive rules imitate not another normative structure but rather something which is perceived as the natural course of events. In order to explain better the difference between mono-categorial and trans-categorial institutional mimesis, I will exemplify them by describing, respectively, the act of donation in the Italian legal system and the act of *promissio* in ancient Roman law.

Finally, I will conclude my discussion by showing how this mimetic genesis of social institutions, both in the case of mono-categorial and trans-categorial mimesis, can be explained within the more general phenomenon of conceptual blending or integration: in the first case, we have to do with single-scope integration networks based simply on a relation of structural similarity; in the second case, with highly creative, double-scope integration networks based on conceptual metaphors.

Towards a Subject Mode Account of Collective Intentionality

MICHAEL SCHMITZ
Wien

Approaches to collective intentionality are commonly distinguished in terms of whether they locate collectivity in the content, mode or subject of intentional states, that is, in terms of what subjects believe or intend (e.g. Bratman), in a special we-mode (e.g. Searle, Tuomela), or in collective, plural subjects (e.g. Gilbert, Schmid). Despite their differences, all these approaches take for granted the standard model of intentional states as propositional attitudes. In my contribution I argue that we should rethink our understanding of propositional attitudes: their subject is not only aware of the state of affairs it believes to obtain or intends to bring about, but also has at least a sense of her own practical or theoretical position towards that state of affairs. I go on to show that this revised understanding of intentional states can be the basis for an improved understanding of collective intentionality.

I distinguish three levels of collective intentionality in terms of the format or structure of the relevant intentionality – the pre-conceptual level of joint attention and action, the conceptual level of collective intention and belief and common knowledge, and the documental level of institutional reality, where we take up postures in institutional roles such as being a clerk, judge, or professor. For each level, I show the benefits of understanding collective intentionality in terms of subject mode representation.

Joint attention is a matter of attending with rather than to somebody else and thus distinct from mere mutual attention. This distinction can be explained in terms of how the co-attenders figures in the intentional content of their joint attention experiences: as co-subjects rather than as objects. This

content is affectively charged and disposes to joint action. Moreover, the subject mode account can easily avoid the infinite iteration of states that mar traditional approaches such as those of Lewis and Schiffer. The subjects of common knowledge don't have beliefs of the form "I know that you know that p" and "You know that I know that you know that p", and so on, but their relevant thoughts and beliefs are simply of the form "We know that p", that is, they represent each other as joint subjects of knowledge. With regard to institutional reality I argue that it is best understood in terms of what I call "role mode", which is a form of subject mode. That is, in the fundamental case, institutional reality does not – counter to what notably Searle has argued – exist because of *what* we believe, desire or intend. For example, a professor is not a professor because others believe that she is one, but because she takes theoretical and practical positions from the vantage point of this role, and because others also represent and accept her in that role from the vantage points of their roles as her students, colleagues, administrators and so on, and by accepting the rights and obligations that come with the roles that are defined in relation to her role.

The Logical Structure of Institutions
Chair: Luca Tummolini   Sala delle Capriate

Status Markers: the Public Face of Institutions

FILIP BUEKENS
Tilburg & Leuven

What is the role of status markers (documents, labels, signposts, tags, symbolic indicators, the design of place or a building) in a theory of institutions? According to Searle, they mark abstract properties ('In the case of status-functions, there is no structural feature of the X element sufficient by itself to determine the Y function. Physically X and Y are exactly the same thing. The only difference is that we have imposed a status on the X element, and this new status needs *markers*, because, empirically speaking, there isn't anything else there.' (Searle 1995: 69). After criticizing this purely *ornamental* view of status markers, I argue that status markers are best seen as continuants that create common knowledge among agents about how to coordinate their actions in a given context. The *origin* of a status marker is usually a performative speech act which, due to the repeatability and duplicability of the marker (its result), has, apart from a unique context of creation, countless *contexts of application*. In any given context of application, they both *inform* agents and *coordinate* their actions in the direction of an equilibrium. The anthropocentric core of an institution is not collective belief or acceptance, but the existence of symbolic markers that coordinate actions.

What Is Marriage? The Politics and Ontology of Institutional Kinds

FRANCESCO GUALA
Milano

According to so-called "semantic arguments", extending civil marriage to same-sex couples would change the nature of the institution and the meaning of the term "marriage". Semantic or definitional arguments have been discussed by legal scholars, have been used in courts to resist the extension of civil marriage to same-sex couples, and have been repeatedly used by politicians to denounce the attempt of "activist judges and local officials" to "redefine marriage". Surprisingly, however,

philosophers have not paid the attention these arguments deserve. Part of the reason is that the arguments of politicians and religious leaders are often formulated in a way that makes it difficult to take them seriously. How can institutions have "meanings", for example? And how can we distinguish between the "true" and the "false" meaning of an institution? Because semantic arguments are often shrouded in confusion, it seems wiser to just ignore them.

In this paper I will take a different stance: I will argue that semantic arguments about marriage are interesting and important. By paying attention, we can learn much about the ways in which institutional reforms can be supported by means of rational argument. In particular, I will argue that two argumentative strategies that are commonly used to support the extension of marriage to same-sex couples – the "empirical" and the "constructivist" strategies – suffer from serious flaws. But I will also show that there are alternative ways to attain the goals that empirical and constructivist theorists hold dear. I will defend a position that is able to combine the realist insight that what counts as marriage is determined by the way the world is, independently of our wishes; and the constructivist intuition that institutions can be changed (to some extent) to fit our normative desiderata. Finally, I will show that this position has some interesting implications concerning the division of labour within the intellectual community, in particular the expertise concerning the correct application of institutional terms like "marriage".

The paper is structured as follows: in the second section I will formulate precisely the so-called "semantic argument" about marriage, relying especially on the contribution of Robert Stainton in the "Halpern v. Canada" appeal. Sections three and four assess empirical and constructivist strategies to defend same-sex marriage against the semantic argument. Section five outlines an alternative solution based on the distinction between tokens and types of institutions. In section six I sketch a theory of institutions as bundles of rules, according to which the identity of an institution-type depends on the problems it solves rather than on the way in which the problems are solved. Finally, in section seven I defend Adèle Mercier's claim that judges do not have the expertise to decide what marriage is, but only to assess the consistency of specific laws with general constitutional principles. Conversely, I will argue, social scientists are experts concerning the nature of institution-types but do not have the authority or the expertise to answer normative questions about the legitimacy of token institutions.

Interactive Kinds, Groups and Collective Intentionality

OLIVIER OUZILOU
Lorraine/Archives Poincaré-CNRS

Hacking's concepts of 'looping effect' (LE) and 'interactive kind' (IK) refer to a specific kind of interaction between a category and people who are classified as belonging to this category: the first arc of the loop is one in which the individuals categorized react to being categorized and act accordingly; this response causes social scientists or categorizations' producers to revise and adjust their original categorization, prompting thereby the second arc of the loop. This interactive process can go on indefinitely. The concepts of IK and LE are supposed to have an explanatory relevance in addition to their descriptive role: they refer to a mechanism underlying social phenomena, and correspond with a specific causal trajectory. They must enable us to make inferences about the social agents' behavior, the evolution of norms and institutions. Dynamics and inferences mentioned above focus on the behavior of individual agents. But what about *collective* agents? My aim is dual: I want to show, first, the multiple existing links between IK and collective entities and, second, that depending on the kind of groups there are different kinds of interactive influences. More precisely, I argue that IK can generate a specific type of collective intentionality. As Pettit says (2004, 175), we can distinguish, among unorganized collections of people

related in more or less arbitrary ways, (1) groups of people who share a common feature that does not affect their behavior from (2) groups of people who share a common feature that does affect their behavior, but without leading them to do anything in common. By contrast, (3) 'purposive groups' (Pettit, 2004, 176) are collections of individuals who coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a common goal. The first type of IK's influence is constitutive: some groups are indeed created by interactive mechanism which can generate the change from kind (1) to kind (2). But this mechanism can also generate the change from unorganized kinds (1) and (2) to unified kind (3). I will focus on a third possibility: the fact that the interactive mechanism can affect a pre-existent purposive collectivity (3) and, therefore, that a specific type of collective intentionality can contribute to modify the categorization of the group and generate LE. After showing such cases, my aim is to emphasize three consequences of this analysis. First, it helps to clarify an important part of the horizontal interactions between such collective. Second, it enables us to extend the relevance of the social mechanisms of IK and LE by applying them at the 'meso-level' of organizations. Third, it helps to understand that collective subjects as such are also moving targets: it explains, therefore, that the ideal of an ultimate categorization of goal-oriented groups is by definition illusionary.

Institutional Ontology as an Ontology of Types

LORENZO PASSERINI GLAZEL
Milano-Bicocca

I will investigate some aspects of the type-token relationship within the ontology of social and institutional phenomena: properties inherited by tokens from types; types as *causae primae* of the institutional effects "triggered" by the tokens; the relation of imputation (in contrast to causation); type-related impossibility. By opposing institutional types, as "katalogical", to mere "analogical" types, I will then suggest that the ontology of institutional phenomena, in contrast with the ontology of natural and brute phenomena, is primarily an ontology of types.

Cooperation and Team Reasoning

Chair: Claudia Rosciglione   S. Antonio Abate

Joint Action, Normativity, and Agent-Neutral Reasons

MATTEO BIANCHIN
Milano-Bicocca

Normativity plays a pivotal role in recent debates on joint action and collective intentionality. Yet mainstream theories tend to sever the kind of normativity involved in joint actions and social institution from the normative issues at stake when it comes to assessing them – suggesting that the latter belong to a separate domain of evaluative questions, which is external to the mechanisms and processes by which social actions and institutions are brought into being. Gilbert, for instance, maintains that the kind of commitments involved by joint actions have nothing to do with moral commitments. Similarly, Searle has claimed that institutions can be accepted or recognized without being approved. Zailbert and Smith have drawn the conclusion that talks of normativity in this context have nothing to do with the normativity of moral and rational standards by which social institution are taken to be assessed by social contract theory. In this paper I argue that there is no rationale for this conclusion and defend the view

that the norms operating within joint actions and social institutions are connected with the rational and moral norms involved in assessing them. In the first section I review the state of the art. Both contractarians like Gauthier and contractualists like Rawls argue that rational and/or moral principles constrain the range of institutions that can be possibly constructed. In a similar vein, although in a different context, Habermas claims that practical reason pervasively operates in the social world. The common point is that, as institutions rest on acceptance, and there are conditions under which it is irrational to accept them, institutions are to be justified to those who are bound by them in order for a system of cooperation to be stable over time. In the second section, I argue for the continuity thesis. Drawing on Tomasello's work on cooperation, I maintain that there is a significant continuity between the psychological infrastructure of shared intentionality and the normative requirements of practical reason. According to Tomasello the norms of fairness and reciprocity are ontogenetically rooted in the socio-cognitive capacities and pro-social motives involved in children's early capacity for joint action. Yet I argue that only later development in social cognition, involving the acquisition of a representational theory of mind, supply the cognitive resources for accessing objective, agent-neutral reasons, so that the pro-social motives involved in the most elementary forms of cooperation can be expected to develop into a system of universal norms of fairness. I conclude by suggesting that the construction of social reality is not only subject to physical and psychological constraints, but also to normative constraints. These set the standards against which social institutions are assessed, yet they are not external to them, as they emerge from the cognitive infrastructure of cooperation.

Disentangling Forms of Control: Help and Cooperation

EMANUELE BOTTAZZI
Trento-ISTC-CNR/Milano-San Raffaele
NICOLAS TROQUARD
Paris-Est Créteil

The notion of cooperation has been considered extensively in analytic social philosophy in conjunction with the notion of joint agency and collective intentionality. We provide a conceptual analysis of cooperation leveraging on the notion of help, developed in a previous work. This will allow us to elaborate a notion of cooperation that is minimal, i.e. having less requirements than the ones available in the current literature, and being, at the same time, flexible enough to mirror current language use. Moreover, our account allows to overcome some pitfalls recently highlighted in the literature and to ground joint action on notions such as control, help and cooperation. To do so we focus on the effectiveness of both help and cooperation, instead of looking at the mentalistic aspect of those kind of actions. Both help and cooperation are, according to us, interpersonal forms of control between agencies. Traditionally, to exercise control, possibilities have to be open to the agent, but there are situations where we could say that an agent has some control over some state of affairs without the possibility of doing otherwise. It is in this regard that help is a kind of interpersonal control, because help involves precisely the effectiveness in providing what the helpee needs in order to achieve what she is trying to accomplish. That is, help is when the helper brings it about that if the helpee tries to bring about some state of affair, then this very state of affairs is the case. Another important condition for actual help to take place is that of autonomy. The helpee has to autonomously generate her trying, for someone to be considered as helping her in her direction. Suppose you get arrested and police wants you to help them in finding some "terrorist" in exchange of your freedom. Even if you are forced by torture, or brainwashed, somebody could any way say that you helped the police to find a criminal. The attempt to find the terrorist is autonomously acquired by the police. On the other hand, it is not easy to say that police helped you in getting out of prison. This is because your trying in getting out of it is not

autonomously acquired, being this caused by the police. The issue of autonomy is here central to disentangle the notion of help and the one of cooperation. As one can force another one in cooperation, that is, she can bring about that the other tries to bring about some state of affairs that is the object of cooperation. Surely the police blackmailing you is not helping in achieving your goals, but in any case you are collaborating with them to find the terrorist, even if the attempt of finding him is not autonomously acquired by you. This shows that cooperation does not reduce to mutual help, but it consists in an interlocking of mutual interpersonal actions of control towards some state of affairs that the parties try to achieve.

Planning and Team Reasoning

RAUL HAKLI
Aarhus
PEKKA MÄKELÄ
Helsinki

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions play a major role in deliberation of rational agents. Since Bratman's (1987) influential book, future-directed intentions have been understood as closely related to plans. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game theory has recently put forth by the theory of team reasoning (see, e.g., Bacharach, 2006) in which the agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual's momentary act. In the case of planning, the larger unit is the temporally extended plan. In the case of team reasoning, the larger unit is the multi-agent collective act. Thus, team reasoning and planning can be seen to be intimately related forms of decision-making: Team reasoning is momentary planning across individuals, and planning is individual team reasoning over points of time.

In so far as one individual's component in the larger unit does not necessarily maximize expected utility, the method of selecting actions on the basis of the evaluation of the larger unit, clashes with game theory and decision theory. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Michael Bratman (2014) has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. Raimo Tuomela (2013) has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning almost completely in this context. We argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness: On the one hand, Bratman's account of shared agency seems to lack an important reasoning mechanism that enables the agents to coordinate their actions in pursuit of group's objectives. As a result, Bratman fails to demonstrate the plausibility of his continuity thesis according to which his theory provides an account of basic forms of sociality based on an underlying model of individual planning agency without the need to introduce fundamentally new elements. On the other hand, Tuomela's account of group agency remains incomplete, because it does not cover temporally extended planning, which, we argue, is a crucial element of group agency.

We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela's we-mode approach and Bratman's planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group

agency. We will take the first steps to that direction by sketching the main features of an account of planning group agency.

Social Reasons for Action

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I first briefly give a general account of the notion *reason for action*, and I distinguish between external and internal reasons. The former are then labeled *reasons for the agent* and the latter *the agent's reasons*. Next I will turn to *social* reasons for the formation of the group intention and to reasons for acting according to it. When discussing social reasons, a pivotal role is given to the notion of group intention (we-intention): On the one hand, it serves as a proximate reason for group members to perform their parts of the joint action, but on the other hand the members usually have social reasons for their group intentions. Accordingly, two accounts are distinguished in terms of the different roles that some notion of group intention has. In particular, I discuss team reasoning (e.g. in Bacharach 1999) and theories of collective intentions (e.g. as presented in Bratman 2014, Tuomela 2013). The former is concerned with reasoning about collective ends, with weighing available joint action alternatives or joint outcomes against one another, while the latter is concerned with maintaining the compatibility of subplans with one another and with the intended joint action, viz. with weighing various alternative means with respect to one another and to the collective end. We could say that questions of collective *reasonability* concern the weighing and choosing between collective ends, whereas questions of collective *rationality* concern the criteria of choosing means, given a fixed collective end. Given that the group intentions (we-intentions) are the members' reasons for performing their parts, what kind of social reasons do these we-intenders have for these we-intentions? I will further discuss four types of social reasons: group preference, collective acceptance, social norm, and social obligation. For example, given that the agent's proximate reason for choosing her component action is group preference, viz. she intends to choose as her action her component in the group-preferred outcome, we can go on and ask why she chooses her component in the group-preferred outcome. And, furthermore, does she have to have a further *reason* for choosing her component in the group-preferred outcome? Or did she choose because, say, she was disposed to "identify with the group" and this disposition together with the prevailing circumstances triggered her choice without her having any further reason for her choice? Or shall we say that the "real" reason for her choosing her component in the group-preferred outcome was that she wanted to comply with the expectations of her fellow members? It is often argued that the above types of reason accounts of her choice are incompatible, but I will argue that in normal cases they are complementary. They are not on a par, however, and they, at least in typical cases, form a hierarchical structure of reasons.

PRACTICAL INFORMATION

Conference Venue

The conference venue is Palazzo Chiaramonte Steri in Piazza Marina 61.

Registration and information

You will find the conference registration and information desk on Thursday in front of the entrance of Sala Magna in Palazzo Chiaramonte Steri. Registration and information desk will be open on Thursday 24th from 8:00 am until 9:00 am, and then during the morning sessions of the conference.

Conference Rooms

The selected talks will be held in Sala Magna, Sala delle Capriate and S. Antonio Abate. Sala Magna is located on the 2nd floor, Sala delle Capriate is on the 3rd floor, S. Antonio Abate is on the ground floor right after the Palazzo Steri.
The plenary lectures, the book review symposia, and the Assembly meeting of the International Social Ontology Society will be held in Sala Magna.

Internet
WI-FI internet connection is available for conference participants. The password will be provided in the paper version of the present book.

Restaurants

There are many nice restaurants in the city centre close to Palazzo Chiaramonte Steri. In these restaurants you can have both lunch and dinner:
Le Pergamene, Piazza Marina 48
Al Covo dei Beati Paoli, Piazza Marina 50
Tardi Leopoldo, Piazza Marina 16
Pizzeria Pelle D'Oca, Piazza Marina 32
Lo Scalino del Cardinale, Via Bottai 18
Ristorante Rivugghio allo Scalino, Via Bottai, 18
Palazzo Trabucco, Via Bottai 24
Al covo dell'arte, Via Dei Tintori 22
Gagini Restaurant, Via Cassari35
Antica Focacceria San Francesco, Via Alessandro Paternostro, 58
Pendolo di Canton, Via Della Vetriera 72
Ristorantino Palazzo Sanbuca, Via Alloro 26
Ristorante De Gustibus, Vc. Fonderia 3/5

Coffee and Coffee Break

Coffee break will take place at the buvetteria of the Palazzo Steri area.

There are plenty of cafés around the University area, for example:
Bottai Pub Caffe, Via Bottai 62
Bar Johnpep, via Vittorio Emanuele 76
Cioccolateria Lorenzo, via Quattro aprile 7
La nuova caffetteria, via Vittorio Emanuele 132
Cioccolateria, via Maletto 4
Tabù Cafè, via G. Meli 16

Buffet Lunch

Buffet lunch will take place on the 24th and 25th at the buvetteria.

Dinner on September 24th

The dinner on the 24th will be held at Villa Niscemi, the official representative seat of the City of Palermo, at 20:30.

Social Dinner

The social dinner will take place at 20:30 on the 25th at the Castello a Mare.

Transportation from/to airport

The Airport of Palermo, "Falcone-Borsellino", is located at about 35 Kms from the city. The city can be reached by bus and taxi.
Bus: Prestia e Comandè (phone: +39 091 586351 or + 39 091 580457) is a transportation company connecting the Airport with Palermo Central Train Station (Stazione Centrale di Palermo, Piazza Giulio Cesare, about 1.2 Kms from the Palazzo Steri) and their busses have multiple stops in the city.
There is a bus every half an hour, starting from 4:00 am until 22:30 from the Central Train Station and from 05:00 am until 24:00 from the Airport. The tickets cost € 6.30 (one way) or € 11,00 (roundtrip), and they can be bought on the bus.
Details available on the company website: www.prestiaecomande.it.
The stop closest to Palazzo Steri is Palermo Central Train Station.
Taxi: A taxi service is available at the Airport, outside the arrival terminal
Coop. Taxi Trinacria: phone: +39 091-225455
Coop. Taxi Autoradio: phone: +39 091-513311
The cost of the trip from the Airport to Palermo Central Train Station is about € 45,00.

Public Transportation in Palermo

AMAT is the bus public company of the city of Palermo. Details about trips and costs are available here:
http://www.amat.pa.it/